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N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
two North Plains Mall Limited Partnerships in which Aiinand Smith and Virginia Smith 
were limited partners, by conduct that was deceitful, malicious, self-obsessed and wrongful, 
breached its iidueiaiy duties to the Mnuh.v converted the i\i:;iu-!Miip asset: .. i ... 
Kr-acli ' ' ] - : • « • • > ' ' " i . m . IM- . i - ••: \ f ! ..i-/ —v /]-sion, the two 
North Plains Partnerships owned as the only Partnership asset, the North Plains Mall, a large 
commercial shopping center in northeastern New Mexico. 
contract and conversion of Partnership assets. After substantial discovery and pre-trial 
motions, the case went to trial by jury before District Judge Frank J. Noel on March 26. 
2001. After being charged as to the law of fiduciary duty, conversion, nrea... . . 
<. ..(-. - ! - *". . . - 1 . 3 • ! • . it. na<n^ a unanimous 
jury returned its verdict on April 12, 2001 finding that Price had breached its fiduciary duty 
to Smiths, converted Partnership assets to its own purposes and breached both rartnu>hip 
Agreenu \ab i, • tim; • :: i ^..- u-i - • • • ! s 
The jury also determined, under Instructions that have not been appealed, that the 
misconduct of Price as to the fiduciary duty and partnership conversion counts, was willful 
ormaliLious or m reckless or warn on aisregard ol Smith > n hi:* ami puUhnl Ihi I " *"- il 
pumtiXL damages. ; ,;.n :^ s :wuir.; ^mage statute, the Court proceeded 
lrThe operative facts took place when Appellant's name was Price Development Company 
(herein "Trice" or "Price Development"), the name having been changed by "Price" to 
"Fairfax Realty" when it formed the JP Realty Real Estate Investment Trust. 
1 
to hear further evidence, argument and instructions, whereupon a unanimous jury returned 
a verdict of punitive damages in the sum of $5,500,000. District Judge Noel, pursuant to 
this Court's holding in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 
("CrookstonJT) articulated Special Findings supporting the jury's punitive damage award. 
On June 30, 2001, the Court denied Price's motions for JNOV and for new trial and entered 
judgment in favor of Smiths for compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and 
costs and costs. Price appeals the judgment. 
RESULT SOUGHT BY APPELLEES IN THIS APPEAL 
Price has failed to marshal the evidence and to raise any issue in which error was 
committed. The District Court judgment should be affirmed in all respects. Smiths, under 
the Partnership Agreements, are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred 
in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Price has presented a misleading and highly selective Statement of Facts so that this 
Court is simply unapprised from its Brief as to what the issues and evidence were at trial. 
Moreover, Price has fundamentally failed to satisfy the requirements of Appellate Rule 
24(a)(7) and controlling case law to marshal the facts and to state them in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and judgment. Therefore, Smiths set out their Statement of Facts. 
1. The Parties and the Partnerships. Armand L. Smith and Virginia Smith 
("Smiths") were residents of Clovis, New Mexico, a regional city approximately 200 miles 
east of Albuquerque. (R 4539 @ 143-44.) Armand Smith contributed the land for the Mall 
to the North Plains Partnerships for 20% or $510,305 less than its fair market value and in 
2 
return, Smiths received a 15°/o limited partnership interest in the AK.H neisni| 
u< I - ' ) 
Price Development was one of the largest owner/operators of commercial shopping 
malls and retail properties in the intermountain states of New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, 
( i.iuniiio. Arizona.. N . \ au . , .. w v » M S i- ( 
p ' v |f ! I* ^ h. r wned 99.99% and controlled all of the Company's stock. (R 4542 
@ 567; R 4552 @ 2164.) In November 1984. Smith entered into two substantially identical 
Partnership Agreements v. .in > .^c Development • i\irineiHi:; 
"IVvi lopiiiriil Piiiliu ••• ••••.•-. * iii* t' North Plains Mall 
(the "Mall"), as a regional shopping center in Clovis. (P-l'v P-16 ) (See Addendum .Vi 
Price drafted the Partnership Agreements, which baMcallv proviikd UK. same equity 
ownership: 
Price Development Coi npany (General Partnei ;<)o 
Price Development Company (Limited Partnei 1 ^% 
John Price or John Price Educational hits! II (J PHI II) (Limited Pannei i 55% 
NP Investment Company (Price Executives)(Limited Partner 10% 
Armand Smith (Li.mi.ted Partner) 1.5% 
100% 
•5 a Ai- h a Art 4, R 4542 (ft 574.) 
_. - s Unfoi _ ini That It Was Entitled, as General Partner, to 
Convey the Partnership Property to the JP Realty Kl I I. \ I though lost by I Vice at trial 
a . . u :. : \ . • M i i e i . • • . - •- h ^ . i :. l . • 
general partner, to o *nvev the Mall without Smiths' consent, to the J.P. Realty REIT ("J.P." 
ii ' : Realty" stands lor "John Price") and whelher uch conveyance was a non-
2Upon divorce the Smith interest was di\ ided between Armand and Virginia. 
partnership purpose. Smiths' evidence was that such a conveyance was for a non-
partnership purpose and that it constituted a fiduciary duty breach, conversion of assets and 
breach of the Partnership Agreements. Price's evidence was that Price, as general partner, 
had authority to convey the property to the JP Really REIT without Smiths' consent and that 
it was for a proper partnership purpose. The Partnership Agreements provided that the 
purpose of the Partnerships was: 
"to acquire, construct, develop, manage, lease, and deal with regard to . . . 
land and improvements . . . to be known as the 'North Plains Mall.'" 
(P-15 @ Art. 5, P-16 @ Art. 5.) Such Agreements also provided that Price, the general 
partner, had the "right and duty of managing the business and exclusive control" over the 
Mall "except as limited by [the partnership] agreement." ( P-15 Art. 7.1; P-16 Art. 7.1.) 
Article 7.6 of both Partnerships required 90% approval of the limited partners before Price, 
the general partner, could assign the partnership property for a non-partnership purpose. 
The 90% requirement was included in the Partnership Agreements for the protection of 
Smiths. (R 4540 @ 213-15.) There was no dispute in the evidence that Smiths, as limited 
partners, never consented to or ratified the conveyance of the Mall to the JP Realty REIT 
(the "REIT"). John Price's own testimony shut the door on the disputed issue of whether 
the conveyance of the Mall to the REIT was a "non-partnership purpose" requiring Smiths' 
15% consent: 
By Mr. Campbell: 
Q "As of 1984, when the North Plains Mall Partnerships were entered into, it 
was not your intent, as the CEO of Price Development Company, at that time, 
to transfer the North Plains Mall into a REIT, was it? . . . 
A No. We just operated the property as a singular property. 
4 
Q When these agreements were put together, you were not even considering uim-
possibility of this property being transferred, that is to say this N^^^ P 1 ' " ^ 
Mall property being transferred into a REIT7 Isn't that true? 
A 1 don't think that that was an issue at the time. 
Q And that wouldn't have been a partnership purpose for which the partnerships 
were formed, would it? 
A No. The partnership was to operate a property." (R 4542 -a 578; emphasis 
added.) 
• * l . . 1 h - , <
 c a 
partnership assets, and breached its contract, implicitly determined that the conveyance by 
Price to the JP Realh RT1T was not a partnership purpose. 
lie ruan M as /Never insoncm oi IIIIUR-U Mm;mi U M I U U M I U fJ 
Pl.iii !' *-^ ' i-i -I • • mnro\iin/vh forty tenants including J. C. Penny, Wal-Mart, Zales 
Jewelers, Bealls Department Store, Foot I,ocker and B. Dalton Books. (R 4540 @ 220.) 
i- mon Sears became another anchor tenant ' . _wr ixp^.u 
In conversations with representatives of Price from L.'<6 through 1990, Smith was 
consistently informed that Price was pleased with the perfomiance of the Mall. (R 4540 @ 
mentioned, orally or in writing, that the Mall was in financial trouble (R 4540 @ 251-52, 
255) and, in fact, the statements of Price representatives were to the contrary. (R id.) Price 
executives t-1w <<..;;.,;,.;!; I*;VJ was IIK nest year evei :.•: ::.. 
@ 2 6 ° ' •" ' • -h, MaP • i/ivased annualh from $1,028,000 in 
1990 to $1,200,000 in 1994. (R 4541 & 374-383.; 
IiI a September 26, 1991 letter to Chemical Bank, i\ml Mendenhail uw I\ice, 
represented the strength of the Mall as follows: 
"I'm sure, as you have watched the progress of the North Plains over the last 
year, you are pleased as we are to see the project at over 95% occupancy. The 
market remains strong. The Mall continues to dominate the retail market." 
(P-146) (emphasis added). 
4. The 1989 "Capital Call". In December 1989, Mendenhall, for Price, sent Smith 
a letter requiring a capital contribution from Smiths for their 15% limited Partnership 
interest of $230,640 to cover the capital construction costs of a theater and Sears building. 
(P-34, P-82, R 4540 @ 240, 316; R 4541 @ 349, 351.) Price's portion of the call was 
$1,294,210. Mendenhall told Smith that the capital call would be actually treated as a 
"loan" so that interest would be paid. However, while Smiths were never at any time 
accrued or paid interest on the loan, Price consistently accrued compound interest to John 
Price and itself on its portion of the "capital call." (R 4540 % 247-248; R 4549 @ 1771-72.) 
5. Financing of the North Plains Mall. Price built the Mall with borrowed funds, 
including a Chemical Bank loan for $12,000,000. (R 4541 @ 420-21; R 4545 @ 1058, 
1063; D-256; R 4545 @ 1058.) The Chemical loan had an original maturity in October 
1991, but was routinely rolled six times. (R 4551 @ 2081-82; R 4545 @ 1065-66; D-272.) 
The last loan extension made the loan due on January 15, 1994 unless otherwise extended 
for an additional period of six months to July 15, 1994. (R4545 @ 1175-77, D-356 @\ 1.) 
The Chemical loan was not in default as of September 24, 1993. the date of the sixth loan 
extension. (R 4545 @ 1178.) Mendenhall for Price testified that it was "assumed" that 
Price could have met the conditions for a further extension of the Chemical loan until July 
1994. (R 4545 @ 1177-78.) 
6 
"i \* ivc Detween 1 J... ...... . L ,';.^e auempu.: T 
*••.. ••-h>;nv loan commitment or other 
financing arrangement." (D-322.) Invariably; Oliver attempted to obtain long-term 
financing not just for the Mall, but simultaneous!) KM uihu shopping malL> i-i i'l.ee 
Development;^:;:.. : h \ ..-i ; ( •—*--»i' Mm ,1 
"i: • iciiiicti buyer: 
By Mr. Campbell: 
O 'Alright. But the fact is sir, that when you undertook iiiM arrangement to 
obtain a loan commitment or other financial arrangement in 1991. at that time 
there hadn't been any thought given, to a potential ^nle ^f the pi^ p<M-n i ».! 
there? 
When we were retained, the objective was to arrange financing, to refinance 
the loan that was on the property." (R 4548 @ 1615, 1619; emphasis added.) 
6. Price's Real Reason for the REIT and Conveyance to It of The North Plains 
Mall. JJespi;. . . .ce b a>suui*n> , . - ' 
Mall . I'! r * MU the Mall's insolvency (R 4542 a 017; R4545 @ 1089; R4550 
@ 1922-23), the evidence plainly showed that the REIT was formed for the purpose of 
eliminating over $94.400,000 of debt of John Price had personally guaranteed on ail of his 
I'i ice pn-pcrlies ]n •>< . t. . • .t, . , *; • - • s ? , . • . ^R 
4544 @ 903-906; P-71 @ 8.) All of the Price properties (contained in 74 partnerships) had 
over $221,700,000 in debt, over fifty/ percent of ^ '<.nJi was coming due m . - . - -t , . 
"f oni led. to continue and expand, tl le business of certain affiliated compani.es 
owned and controlled by John Price, Chairman ol the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Company |J P Realty lnc.|." (emphasis added.) 
and to do so in a tax free transaction which preserved .:••!.;. . ; ice s ia\ ^uiu.. pp !L 
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23; R 4550 @ 1923.) 
In 1993, Price was attempting to secure financing on all of its properties, and the Mall 
was only a minor part of the package. (R 4540 @ 269-70.) By creating the JP Realty REIT 
and rolling into it all Price's shopping malls and other properties, including the North Plains 
Mall, Price could eliminate the $94,400,000 of John Price's personal guarantees. In 
addition, John Price and other Price executives could make millions by the public offering 
of their participating units (or stock) in the REIT on the New York Stock Exchange. (R 
4544 @ 899-906; P-71 @ 7-8.) Lastly, the Chemical Bank loan conditions on the Mall 
required that John Price, personally, maintain a financial net worth of at least $40,000,000, 
and the REIT structure would allow John Price to escape this requirement. (R 4944 @ 906.) 
7. Strength of the Commercial Mall Market in 1993-94. John F. Howden, MAT 
an expert witness in commercial shopping mall evaluations, testified that the market in late 
1993 as of January 1, 1994 was active, doing well, and had strengthened since 1991. (R 
4542 @ 632; R 4546 @ 1324.) After examining the sale of some 30 regional shopping 
malls throughout the County and also utilizing a capitalization approach, Howden testified 
that a willing buyer would have paid $16,000,000 for the North Plains Mall as of January 
1,1994. (R 4542 @ 627-33, P-172.) The Chemical loan was only $11,281,000. (R4549 
@ 1785; P-173.) 
8. Price Violated the Partnership Agreements by Commingling Monies. The 
Partnership Agreements required the general partner to deposit all funds into a ''separate 
bank account or accounts" in the partnership name. (P-15 and P-16 @ Art. 6.) But Price 
Development knowingly breached that provision by failing to maintain a separate account 
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MM the '.i.ib .'.M.J u u m p m g monies l ioni i.. iu. n i c e proper t ies i: : 
:•::• . 4 **u\ a ^ - r :~~" 77 41S ' " R 4550 @ 2028; Depo. 
Peterson pp. 29-30.) The tracing and accounting for monies belonging to the Partnerships 
w as thus made far more difficult., (R 4548 @ 1707-1708.,) 
' - *ee \ iniaieu me ra i m n >mp Agn-unents By I *a\ ii ig Itself Ii iflated 
Management i n : rice's subsidiary conin;m\, Price Management, Inc., managed the 
Partnerships' operations under a side Agreement providing for a 3.9% management fee. /p~ 
M ^ f ^ p —^ Tn violation ol ihat Agreement foi the J \ear> . n i u-p -„. n ice pa.u \ .... 
$10,000 each year. (R 4546 @ 1205-07.) 
" 1 PJ ' :e Breached the Partnership Agreements By Manipulating the 
r a r t i U i M i i p J a x I U t i l l IIS IP I a \ Ol MMin l i t c t a i m * i r j m i i u - m e > n u i i i . v 
!\irtr,; rsliir \<n cements, the general partner prepared the Partnership tax returns 
and K-l's and was required to "prorate" taxable net income oi losses to the limited partners 
"in accordance with their respective ownership interests. {v i; ana r- : o M ,-\n 
ll)l). •• '!••• !»• " 1 * * ^ K . ^ e > mi nice, 
personally, while attributing "phantom taxable income" to Smiths of $491,450. (R 4548 @ 
1561, 1569-70; P-70, P-180.) Because John Price already had a negative capital account in 
. : . . A \ _ toy-in;. ' { . , , , K : , , , m i i . P l ' / i * ^ ; ^ M - : ! •• , l : • , : 
* : nither tax losses to himself and phantom income to the Smiths increased John 
Price's negative capital account to $4,716,582 by the end of 1993. (R 4548 @ 1569-71: P-
56.) 
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This creative bookkeeping by Price caused John Price to have such an extraordinary 
negative capital account in the Partnerships that had the Mall been sold in the open market 
to a third party in 1994, John Price would have had major adverse tax consequences. (R 
4548 @ 1570-71.) The distinct incentive for John Price to transfer the Mall into a REIT, a 
new publicly traded company, was made clear by Price's Mendenhall: 
By Mr. Campbell: 
Q "Were tax issues a consideration? 
A That was the primary reason for the up-REIT structure as it preserved 
everyone's tax status. . . ." (R 4550 @ 1923; emphasis added.) 
11. Price's Decision and Creation of the JP Realty REIT in July-September 
1993. On July 19, 1993, two of Price's top officers, Mendenhall and Rex Frazier, 
telephoned Smith and indicated that John Price had decided to form a REIT into which Price 
would roll-up some or all of its shopping malls and other commercial properties, including 
the Mall. Mendenhall and Frazier did not explain a REIT transaction to Smith or seek 
Smith's consent or ratification to such a transaction for the Mall, but rather they called to 
obtain some type of a REIT qualification from Smith as to a REIT. (R 4541 @ 488, 490.) 
Smith expressed concern to the Price officers that he had not been involved with and did not 
know anything about a REIT and its effect on Smiths' interests in the Mall. (R 4540 @ 264-
65,267.) 
12. Price Gave Smiths "Three Options." In the July 18th conversation, Mendenhall 
and Frazier gave Smiths three options with respect to their 15% interest in the Partnerships: 
i. Price would purchase (cash out) the Smiths in the Partner ships; 
ii. Price would contribute its 85% interest in the Partnerships to the REIT 
and the Smiths would be 15% partners as to the Mall with the REIT; 
iii. The entire Mall would be contributed to the REIT and Smiths would 
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receive stock in the REIT. (R 4540 @ 270-271; P-57.) 
Mendenhall and Frazier told Smith that they would get back to him. (R 4540 @ 274.) 
However, neither Mendenhall nor Frazier, nor anyone else from Price, contacted Smith 
regarding the "three options" during July, August, September or October 1993. (R 4540 @ 
274.) Price did three things in August - October 1993 without telling Smiths. First. Price 
formed the JP Realty REIT in early September. Second, Price retained expensive Wall 
Street lawyers and investment bankers who prepared and filed the September 15 draft 
Securities and Exchange Commission S-l 1 Registration Statement of JP Realty Inc., the first 
of six, which represented, without Smiths' knowledge or consent, that it owned all the 
properties going in to the REIT, including the Mall as one of eight major malls "of Price 
Development." (R 4542 @ 499-501; P-163.) Third, Price signed two "Contribution 
Agreements" with itself in which it "contributed" the Mall to the REIT. (P-58; P-59.) Price 
allocated heavy expenses of the REIT public offering to the Mall. (R 4540 @ 291-97.) 
While the Contribution Agreements3 were actually signed in late September or 
October 1993 by Price as general partner of the Partnerships, they were backdated to 
September 13, 1993 so that they were in effect at the time of the SEC Registration Statement 
on September 15, 1993. (R 4542 @ 510-512; R 4550 @ 1993; P-58, P-59 @ 23.) Price 
never disclosed to Smiths at that time that any Contribution Agreements had been signed, 
much less backdated, and, indeed, no disclosure was made until the latter part of April 1994, 
3The Contribution Agreements were essentially Agreements between Price Development and 
itself, since Mendenhall and Frazier were both Price employees, one signing for Price 
Development, the general partner, and the other signing for the REIT operating entity, a new 
company called Price Development Company, a Maryland LLC. (R 4542 @ 528-30.) 
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months after the JP Realty REIT had been fully implemented. (P-71, 2nd para.; R 4542 @ 
513-14; R 4550 @ 1997; P-59 p.l.) 
13. Price Did Not Make a Fair Market Value or Other Independent Evaluation 
of the Mall. Price executives admitted, at trial, that as the general partner of the Mall, it did 
not obtain and did not even want a fair market value appraisal of the Mall before 
contributing the Mall to the REIT. (R 4541 @ 363; R 4542 @ 528; R 4545 @ 1150.) In 
fact, Price "ignored" the fair market value of the Mall adopting its own "REIT value" based 
on a capitalization rate that was a "backed-into rate." (R 4545 @ 1165-68; R 4541 @ 363, 
364.) 
Although not mentioned by Price's Brief, another core issue at trial was whether "fair 
market value" or "REIT value" was the test for valuing the Partnership interests in the Mall. 
In its JP Realty Prospectus to investors in the stock market, Price acknowledged that a 
primary "Risk Factor" was that the contributed commercial malls and properties, including 
the North Plains Mall, to the REIT "was not based on independent appraisals or arms-length 
negotiations" between Price Development and JP Realty. (P-71 @ p.2.) (See Addendum 6.) 
Rejecting Price's position, Judge Noel ruled that in light of the Partnership Agreements and 
controlling law, the evaluation of the limited partners' interests in the real estate Partnerships 
were based on "fair market value" and that Price's "REIT value" computations would be 
admissible only for the purpose of evaluating Price's conduct as to the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. (R 4546 @ 1196-99, 1287-88.) (See Addendum 4.) Price has not appealed 
Judge Noel's ruling on this issue. 
14. Further Inquiry By Smiths As to the Three Options. In November 1993, 
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Smith spoke further with Price's Mendenhall about the REIT and the "three options." Smith 
asked for financial information regarding the market value of Smiths' 15% equity ownership 
in the Partnerships and the repayment of the Partnership capital call/loan. Smith expressed 
to Mendenhall his understanding that the three options were available to Smiths and that 
Smiths' consent to the REIT transfer was required, but Mendenhall did not tell Smith that 
the Mall had already been contributed to the REIT. (R 4540 @ 278, 280-81.) 
On December 1, 1993, Mendenhall for Price faxed to Smith a "preliminary 
computation" of the "estimated REIT value" of the Mall. (R 4540 @ 286-90; P-64.) In a 
telephone call the following day, Mendenhall told Smith that Price had valued the Mall 
using Price's own formula of a "REIT value." Because of Smith's background in real 
property valuation, he knew that the "REIT value" was not an evaluation of "fair market 
value" and, as such, took issue with Price's REIT computation. (R 4540 @ 288-89.) Smith 
raised a number of issues with Mendenhall in the December 2, 1993 conversation including 
(i) $48,000,000 of the money to be raised by sale of stock in the JP Realty REIT was 
proposed to be used to buy out John Price's partners interest in the Cottonwood Mall in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, but a portion of that expense was being charged to the North Plains 
Mall; (ii) the attorneys, investment bankers and other fees incident to the REIT were 
expected to cost over $16,000,000 with $797,280.00 being charged against the value of the 
Mall and (iii) that it appeared that Price was paying itself and John Price interest on the 
capital call it put into the Mall, but Smiths were not being allocated any interest on the 
capital call they contributed. (R 4540 @ 291-97; P-64; R 4540 @ 291-95; P-66.) 
Mendenhall responded simply that Smith "didn't understand the numbers." (R 4540 @ 297.) 
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Smith did understand two things in the conversation with Mendenhall - the 90% 
consent required and the three options. The same day, December 2, 1993 Mendenhall, 
acting for Price the general partner, wrote Smith stating: 
" . . . to date we have not found an acceptable buyer willing to pay a 
reasonable price for the property or a lender that would loan sufficient funds 
that would not require at least an additional infusion of cash . . . . These facts 
are what prompted my conversation with you some time ago as to whether 
you might have a group of investors who might be willing to purchase the 
properly . . ." (P-65; emphasis added.) 
At the time of the letter (P-651 Mendenhall knew that the Contribution Agreements 
assigning the North Plains Mall to the JP Really REIT had already been signed. (R4550@ 
1994, 1997.) Price had actually disclosed in several drafts of the JP Really SEC Registration 
Prospectus, but Smith did not know of them. As admitted by Mendenhall on cross 
examination, in December 1993 Smith was still trying to get answers with respect to which 
of the "three options" would be of the most benefit. (R 4550 @ 1992-93, 1996-97.) 
15. Price's Implementation of the REIT. On January 21, 1994, the JP Realty REIT 
went public, selling $198,000,000 in stock at $17.50 per share to the investing public. As 
of that date, JP Realty REIT became the owner of all of Price's 38 commercial mall and 
business properties, including the Mall. (P-71 @ pp. 1, 3. 4, 6.) 
On January 13, 1994, Price sent to Smith the sixth draft of the REIT Prospectus, the 
first that Mr. Smith had ever seen. At that time, Price had given no notice to Smiths that 
Price had assigned the Mall to the JP Realty REIT. (R 4540 @ 300.) One day before the 
public offering, January 20, 1994, Mendenhall and Frazier telephoned Smith to talk about 
a guarantee for tax purposes of a portion of a new long-term debt that was being placed on 
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all of Price's properties simultaneously with the REIT stock offering. (R4550 @ 1935-37.) 
Smith again asked Price for computation of what Smiths' interests were to be if there was 
going to be a transfer of the Mall into the REIT. Price gave Smith no answer. (R 4545 @ 
1162.) Smith understood that the "three options" were still available to him. (R 4540 @ 
307.) 
The proceeds from the JP Realty REIT offering were used to (i) pay existing 
mortgage debt on all Price's properties totaling $221.7 million, (ii) purchase the equity 
interests of John Price's partners in the Cottonwood Mall for $45,100,000, and (iii) pay 
other debt and expenses including underwriters' and attorneys' fees of the REIT public 
offering of approximately $18,000,000. (P-71 pp. 7, 8, 27, 28; R 4546 @ 1303-04.) The 
REIT resulted in the following benefits to the general partner, Price, and/or John Price, 
personally: 
iii. The elimination of more than $94,400,000 of John Price' personal guarantees 
on existing loans for the shopping mall and commercial properties, including 
the Mall. (R 4544 @ 903, 988-89; P-71 pp. 8, 26); 
iv. The receipt by a John Price entity of 200,000 voting shares entitling John 
Price to elect two of the seven members of the REIT board of directors. (R 
4544 @ 907; P-71 pp. 8, 26); 
v. John Price wound up with 19.4% of the equity shares in the REIT and other 
Price executives with 1.4%. (P-71 p. 65.) 
vi. The receipt by John Price and other Price executive officers of stock options 
for 475,000 shares of JP Realty stock at the initial offering price. ( R 4544 @ 
907; P-71 pp. 8, 26); 
vii. The control of the Cottonwood Mall by John Price through the purchase of the 
75% interest of two non-Price principals for $45,100,000 from cash raised 
from the REIT. (R 4544 @ 899-90.); 
viii. A deferral of millions of dollars of income tax consequences for John Price 
arising out of the contribution of the North Plains and other properties to the 
REIT. (R 4544 @ 902, 906; P-71 p. 8.); 
ix. The release of John Price from the requirement that he maintain at all times 
a bank-disclosed personal net worth of $40,000,000. (R 4544 @ 906.); 
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x. The control of the affairs of the REIT, including total control of the Mall by 
John Price and the Price principals. (R 4544 @ 907; P-71 pp. 3, 15-16.); and 
xi. The repayment to Price Development of approximately $27,100,000 in loans 
to all of the Price partnerships and commercial malls, including the Mall, all 
of which Price had borrowed and most of which was coming due in 1994. (R 
4544 @ 904, 989; P-71 p. 28.) 
16. Price "Cooked the Partnership Books" of the "REIT Value"Accounting of 
March 8, 1994. Throughout February 1994, Smith waited to obtain information and an 
accounting from his general partner, Price, regarding which of the three options were best. 
(R 4550 @ 1937-39.) Mendenhall did not return calls resulting in Smith's written request. 
(P-80, P-81; R 4540 @ 302-05.) On March 8, 1994 Mendenhall met with John Price and 
two other senior officers of Price (the "Executive Committee") with respect to the 
accounting and proposal that Price, as general partner of the Partnerships, should give to 
Smiths. Acting at the express direction of the Executive Committee, Mendenhall forthwith 
telefaxed to Smith a March 8 letter from Price of the "revised calculation" of the "REIT 
value" of the Mall. (R 4550 @ 1999; P-82 p. 1, 4.) (See Addendum 7.) 
That letter and attached "revised computation" made the following accounting and 
proposal by Price to Smiths: 
The "REIT value" of Smiths' 15% interest in the Mall was $6,160 (based on 
352 units at $17.50 per unit) (R 4541 @ 343; emphasis added); 
The total "REIT value" of the Mall was $41,090 (based on 2,349 units at 
$17.50 per unit) (R 4541 @ 347.); 
Price proposed to make available to Smiths the 352 (or $6,160) in the REIT 
and repay Smiths' 1989 "capital call/loan" of $230,640 without interest. (R 
4541 @343.) 
Undisclosed by Price at the time was the fact that in January 1994 Price's investment 
bankers had made a calculation of the total "REIT value" of the Mall of $363,877, 
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consisting of 20,793 REIT units, of which Smiths' 15% interest was 3,119 having a "REIT 
value" of $54,582.50. (D-449; R 4544 @ 971; R4546 @ 1314.) However, this computation 
of "REIT value" was never disclosed to Smiths until it was forced to through discovery in 
January 2000, after this case had been pending for 5V2 years. (R 4549 @ 1868-71; R 4550 
@ 2011-14.). Smith was incredulous upon receipt of Price's March 8, 1994 letter and on 
March 16 wrote to Mendenhall asking if Price Development was really serious about the 
accounting of "REIT value" accounting and the proposal as to Smiths' Partnership interests. 
(P-85.) (See Addendum 8.) One day later, March 17, 1994, Mendenhall gave Price's 
answer: 
"Your understanding of the valuation and allocation of the units is correct." 
(P-86; emphasis added.) (See Addendum 9.) 
Smith was so disturbed by his general partner's accounting and proposal that he 
sought a meeting forthwith in New Mexico in March to go over the accounting information, 
but Price Development said no, a meeting would be held in Salt Lake City on April 5, 1994. 
(R 4541 @ 360, 364.) Before that meeting took place, Price through Mendenhall, 
"withdrew" its accounting and "revised computation" of 352 REIT shares having a value 
of $6,160. (P-89.) (See Addendum 10.) Nothing was substituted in its place. During the 
April 5, 1994 meeting with Frazier and Mendenhall, Smith inquired about two of the three 
options. (R4541 @360, 364.) For the first time, Frazier and Mendenhall informed Smith 
that Price had transferred the Mall to the REIT under the Contribution Agreements the prior 
September. (R 4541 @ 360.) Smith asked why as a partner in the North Plains Partnerships 
he had not seen the Agreements or been given notice of that transfer. In response 
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Mendenhall for Price informed Smith that: 
"due to the size and significance of [the REIT] transaction, they [Price 
Development] chose to ignore my [the Smiths'] interest." (Emphasis and 
bold added, R 4541 @ 360.) 
17. Price Finally Discloses the Contribution Agreements. On April 22, 1994, 
some seven months after the date of the Contribution Agreements, and three months after 
the public offering and implementation of the REIT, Price sent Smith a copy of the 
Contribution Agreements indicating that as of September 13, 1993, Price had transferred the 
Mall to the REIT. However, Price's April 22, 1994 transmittal conspicuously did not attach 
to the transmitted copies of the Contribution Agreements the REIT accounting. Exhibit B, 
showing an allocation of 20,793 REIT units to the Mall. In June 1994, Smiths retained legal 
counsel (R4541 @ 364.) 
18. Price's Assertion That It Failed to Disclose Upon Advice of Counsel. An 
incidental position of Price at trial was that Price's failure to disclose to Smiths its transfer 
of the Mall to the REIT was on the advice of legal counsel who assisted Price with the REIT 
formation and public offering. Price offered no evidence as to what, if any, the legal advice 
was, when it was made, or for what purpose. Price laid no foundation to show why the 
Smiths, the only limited partners of the Mall who did not have notice, could not be given 
notice as to what Price the general partner had done and was doing with the Partnership 
assets. 
Tellingly, Price presented no evidence as to whether it sought legal advice regarding 
its duty as general partner to make a full disclosure to Smiths, the breach of which 
constituted a breach of the general partner's fiduciary duty as well as being a conversion of 
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Partnership assets. As the trial court found, a substantial reason for the non-disclosure was 
that Price "did not want the Smiths to interfere by filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit 
prior to January 21, 1994 when the JP Realty REIT was created, established and 
implemented." (R4495.) 
19. The Trial — Testimony of John Price. The jury trial began March 26, 2001. 
A hallmark of the 2 Vi week trial demonstrating the seriousness of Price's misconduct was 
the testimony of John Price, himself. Although Mr. Price was the Chairman and CEO of 
Price Development, he was unable to tell the Court and jury even the most general and 
essential aspects about the Mall, the Partnerships, or their operation. Mr. Price did not know 
when the Partnerships were created, what Smiths' Partnership interests were, the reason for 
the Partnership structure, what interest he had in the Partnerships, or who or what was the 
nature of JPET II (John Price Educational Trust). (R 4542 @ 569, 572, 573, 574.) Mr. 
Price did not know whether a fair market valuation had been made of the North Plains Mall 
for ten years or whether he had been allocated by Price a tax loss and deduction in 1993 for 
$883,000 on his personal income tax return, while Price attributed $491,450 in "phantom 
income" to Smiths in the same year. Mr. Price did not know what shares of stock he had 
received in the JP Realty REIT or whether Price sent an accounting and offer to the Smiths 
in March 1994. Mr. Price did not know whether there had been any agreement in which 
Price, as general partner, had transferred without Smiths' consent or ratification, the Mall 
to the REIT. (R 4542 @ 594, 608, 618-19; R 4551 @ 2064.) 
Over 25 times in an examination that lasted a little over an hour, Mr. Price said he did 
not know the answer to what were simple Partnership questions. The jury could have 
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reasonably concluded that this testimony reflected a man of great wealth and fortune, whose 
arrogance, pomposity and indifference translated to willful and wanton neglect and disregard 
for the rights of two small limited partners in Clovis, New Mexico. (R 4551 @ 2052-55.) 
20. The Trial on Liability and Compensatory and Punitive Damages. As part 
of their case in chief, Smiths called in addition to Armand and Virginia Smith several 
adverse witnesses, John Price, Mendenhall and Frazier on the issues of liability. Mr. Smith 
testified that no notice was given of Price Development's transfer of the Partnership assets 
to the REIT or that the three options were gone and that the Smiths expected at all times the 
fair market value of their Partnership interests. (R 4540 @ 216-219.) 
Smiths then called the real estate expert, John Howden, who testified that as of 
January 1994, the date of the breaches, the fair market value of the Mall was $16,000,000, 
judged under the time-honored judicial definition of the "willing buyer and seller in an open 
market and arms-length transaction." Howden predicated his market valuation upon 
accepted and traditional market data and capitalization of income approaches to value. (R 
4542 @ 540; R 4543 @ 701.) Smiths' forensic damage expert, Merrill Norman, CPA, then 
drew upon Howden's fair market value of the entire Mall of $16,000,000, subtracted the 
Chemical Bank loan debt of $11,281,906, (R 4543 @ 807), subtracted the inter-company 
and "capital call" loans, leaving a net value of the Partnership of $993,363 (R4551 @2069; 
P-173.) Norman then calculated the value of Smiths' 15% Partnership interests which, 
together with the capital call loan balance as of January 1994, totaled $377,394. (See 
Addendum 11.) This was exclusive of Smiths' $30,000 water rights contribution to the 
Partnerships. (P-173.) 
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Norman then determined the time value of money on the interests which Smiths had 
been deprived of from January 1, 1994 until March 15, 2001 (the approximate date of trial) 
of $597,221, using the same compounded interest rate of Bank One prime plus 2% which 
Price Development, itself, used on accruing and paying interest to itself on inter-company 
loans and the capital call/loan. No time value of money was given to the $30,000 water 
rights contribution, leaving that issue for the jury. (P-173.) The methodology and 
calculations of Merrill Norman, while not the subject of appeal herein, are set forth as 
Addendum ll .4 (P-173.) 
Price called two of its own real estate experts, J. Cannon and S. Duplantis, who 
testified that the fair market value of the Mall, as of January 1, 1994, was approximately 
$11,390,000 and $12,670,000, respectively. Price's forensic damage witness, ToddNeilson, 
then took a rounded value of $12,000,000, subtracted the debt of the Partnership, and 
determined that the equity value of the Partnership and of Smiths' 15% Partnership interest 
was zero. (D-435.) Neilson's cross-examination testimony demonstrated that if he were to 
assume that the fair market value of the Mall was as Howden had testified, namely 
$16,000,000, then Neilson's methodology was essentially the same as Norman's. (R 4549 
@ 1778; R 4551 @ 2070-71.) 
On April 11, 2001, the jury was instructed as to the elements of the claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty, conversion of Partnership assets, and breach of contract, as well as 
compensatory and punitive damages. (R 4551 @ 2075-77.) None of the jury instructions, 
4Price Development has attached as an Addendum K to their Brief a calculation of Merrill 
Norman that was not admitted in evidence and did not go to the jury. Rather, Exhibit 173, 
Sch. A-2, included as Addendum 11 to Appellees' Brief was, in fact, admitted in evidence. 
21 
including those on punitive damages, are raised as error in this Appeal. The jury deliberated 
upon and returned its Special Verdict on April 11, 2001, finding that Price breached its 
fiduciary duty and proximately caused damages to the Smiths, that Price converted the 
Partnership assets belonging, in part, to Smiths, and that Price breached the Partnership 
Agreements as alleged by Smiths. The jury verdict found compensable damages to be 
$1,100,000, including $410,000 for the loss of the Partnership interests and $690,000 due 
for the time value of money. (R 3737-39.) Attorneys' fees and reasonable costs and 
expenses awarded were $524,744.66. (R 4505) 
The jury further answered the interrogatory that punitive damages should be entered 
against Price Development. (R 3737-39.)5 The following day, additional testimony with 
respect to the wealth of Price Development was introduced. Price Development, although 
scaled down substantially in assets that it had before the REIT, still had net assets of 
$37,000,000, dividends between $1,580,000 and $2,513,000, expenses of $193,000 for John 
Price's use of a corporate jet and $1 million of artwork. (R 4552 @ 2159-68.) The jury 
retired as part of the punitive damage case and returned a verdict of $5,500,000. (R 3743.) 
21. The District Court's Crookston I Special Findings. On June 29, 2001, Judge 
Noel, following the rationale of this Court in Crookston I, entered 5/4 pages of Special 
Findings on the punitive damage verdict of the jury. The trial Court's Special Findings fully 
support the jury's punitive damage verdict under a Crookston I and II analysis. The Special 
Findings are set forth in Addendum 2 attached herein, concluding that "there was 
5Jury was not advised or instructed that under the punitive damage statute, Utah Code. Ann. 
§ 78-18-1(3), 50% of a punitive award, after the payment of $20,000 and attorneys fees, are 
payable to the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
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substantial substantive evidence before the jury upon which a punitive damage award of 
$5,500,000 is considered reasonable." (R 4494). 
Based on the jury verdict and Special Findings of the Court, Judge Noel on June 29, 
2001, entered Judgment for compensatory damages of $1,100,000 for breach of fiduciary 
duty, conversion of Partnership property and breach of contract, for punitive damages in the 
sum of $5,500,000, for attorneys' fees of $517,611 as provided by the Partnership 
Agreements, and for reasonable costs of litigation of $7,133.26. (R 4499-4506.) (See 
Addendum 1.) From the Judgment, Price Development has brought this Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal of Price must fail for the most basic reasons. 
First, Price has failed to comply with the marshaling requirements of this Court. 
Instead it has set forth its highly selective evidence, ignoring the pervasive evidence of 
Price's flagrant breaches of fiduciary duty, conversion of Partnership assets, and breach of 
contract, as well as the substantial evidence that its fiduciary breaches were intentional, 
malicious and in willful and reckless disregard of the Smiths' Partnership rights. 
Second, of fundamental importance, Price has not in this appeal made any federal (or 
state) constitutional challenge to or attack upon the punitive damages verdict of the jury, as 
affirmed by the District Judge. Accordingly, there is no federal constitutional challenge 
which under the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Cooper Ind., would allow Price a de novo 
review in this appeal of the facts underlying the amount of the punitive damages verdict and 
judgment. As this Court clearly stated in Campbell unless there is a federal constitutional 
challenge, the punitive damages verdict is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of 
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review with considerable deference being given to the verdict and judgment of the District 
Judge. 
Third, Price has not appealed the jury verdict or judgment finding that Price breached 
its fiduciary duties to, converted the Partnership assets and interests of, and breached the 
Partnership Agreements with the Appellees, Smiths. As a result, the judgment of the lower 
court on those issues are final and not open to appellate review. Yet Price, pretends in its 
argument that there has been no determination made as to such misconduct, contending that 
all of its conduct was, in fact, noble and commendable. Even apart from the statement that 
the jury and lower Court fully rejected such factual argument, Price is not entitled to argue 
issues which have not been appealed. 
Fourth, once the facts are marshaled, the evidence is overwhelming that Price 
committed brazen and reckless breaches of its fiduciary trust, ignoring the Smiths, cooking 
the Partnership books, and treating the North Plains Mall as though it was its own nest egg. 
It "dumped" and commingled the Mall's accounts with other Price properties, paid itself 
excessive fees, allocated tax losses to John Price while attributing phantom income to Smiths 
and accrued compound interest to itself but not to Smiths on loans. But most importantly, 
Price was found by the jury and the Court, in Special Findings applying Crookston I factors, 
to have engaged in a pattern of deceit, dishonesty, misrepresentation, and failure to disclose 
Price's transfer of the entire Mall to itself for the direct benefit of the JP Realty REIT. It not 
only did so secretly, but also then deceitfully misrepresented the "REIT value" of Smiths' 
Partnership interests to be worth $6 J60, all to the benefit in the millions of Price and its 
owner, John Price. Price deceived Smiths into believing that they had "3 options" with 
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respect to the proposed JP Realty REIT, one of which was to obtain the "fair market value" 
of their Partnership interests. Judge Noel determined that "fair market value" and not 
Price's invented "REIT value" was the test to be applied for a real estate partnership. Price 
has not raised and cannot argue the issue in this appeal. 
As a proximate result of Price's misconduct, Smiths immediately lost their 
Partnership interests in the Mall and suffered direct general damages, as determined by the 
jury of $1,100,000, including the time value of money for the 7 years in which Price had 
profited from his deceit and dishonest breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Applying Crookston I factors, Judge Noel determined that there was substantial 
evidence that Price's breaches of fiduciary duty were intentional, malicious and in willful 
and wanton disregard of Smiths' rights, and that the punitive damage award of $5,500,000 
was fully sustained by the facts. Under any standard, the evidence was overwhelming that 
the punitive damage award in this case was justified and reasonable. 
Price's factual argument that it was justified in breaching its fiduciary duties and 
conveying the Mall to its own REIT in order to save North Plains Mall from bankruptcy, not 
only legally misses the mark, but also it was soundly rejected by the jury and the Court. The 
claimed defense that the transfer of the Mall was done secretly on the advice of counsel is 
legally irrelevant and misses the point that Price's primary duty was as a fiduciary to Smiths. 
The jury also rejected this argument of Price. 
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed in all respects and Smiths 
should be awarded their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PRICE DEVELOPMENT HAS CONSPICUOUSLY FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, AS REQUIRED BY THIS COURT, AND 
ERGO, ITS APPEAL MUST FAIL. 
Price's appeal is based on highly selective evidence which has virtually nothing to 
do with the evidence introduced at trial. Its Fact Statement and consequent Argument is so 
divorced from the testimony and documentary evidence as to pretend that there was really 
no trial and that the only relevant evidence at trial was Price's defense to the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim that it had no other choice apart from the supposedly "imminent 
bankruptcy" of the Partnership but to transfer the Mall without Smiths' knowledge or 
consent into the JP Realty REIT. (App. Br. @ 8.) Even when Price does reference the 
Smith evidence, it is phrased deceptively as though their evidence were merely allegations 
and not actual received evidence.6 
Price Development has ignored the overwhelming, substantive facts including the 
riveting fact that the jury and the Court fundamentally rejected and denied Price's 
"bankruptcy or REIT" defense, rejected all other claims and defenses of Price and found that 
Price (i) had breached its fiduciary duty to Smiths, (ii) had proximately caused damages to 
Smiths, (iii) had converted Partnership assets to its own benefit, enriching John Price in the 
millions upon millions of dollars, (iv) had breached the Partnership Agreements with Smiths 
and (v) that the breaches of fiduciary duty were intentional, malicious or with wanton and 
6See Price Brief"According to Smith,... he had three 'options'" (where all Price witnesses 
acknowledged it) . . .(Br. @ 10); "at trial the Smiths complained . . ." (Br. @ 11); "Smith 
claims that he also asked . . ." "Smiths attempts to get information were allegedly 
unsuccessful" when all witnesses admitted the fact. (Br @ 13) (emphasis added) are 
exemplars of Price's insincere Fact Statement. 
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reckless disregard to the rights of Smiths requiring the entry of punitive damages against 
Price. This Court has made it clear that an appealing party is obligated to marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. 
R.R., 31 P.3d 557, 569 (Utah 2001); Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). 
The Advisory Committee Note to Appellate Rule 24 describes that standard that must be met 
in marshaling the evidence: 
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must 
play the devil's advocate. [Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty . . ., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellate resists." (Citations omitted; 
alternation in original; emphasis added.) 
An appellant who fails to marshal the facts, will fail in the appeal. Crookston L id. at 799-
800. 
The position which Price has taken in this appeal is a paradox of contradiction. On 
the one hand, Price has not appealed the sufficiency of the evidence of the jury verdict and 
Court judgment finding that Price breached its fiduciary duty, converted Partnership assets, 
and breached the Agreements. Therefore, those issues are not before this Court for review. 
On the other hand, Price's Brief attempts to argue that Price's conduct was fully justified as 
to all of those issues and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence for a finding of breach 
of fiduciary duty or conversion of Partnership assets that would demonstrate compensable 
damages or intentional, malicious or willful or wanton disregard of Smiths' rights as to 
punitive damages. Even if Price were correct (which it is not) that in its non-constitutional 
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attack on a punitive damage verdict, this Court must still conduct a "de novo" review of the 
facts, that does not at all eliminate the necessity that Price is required to marshal the facts 
which support the verdict of compensatory and punitive damages of the fiduciary breach, 
the Partnership conversion, and the breach of contract. As stated in Crookston I: 
"Here, Fire Insurance [appellant] has made no attempt to marshal the evidence 
in support of the jury finding of fraud. In fact all Fire Insurance [appellant] 
has done is argue selected evidence favorable to its position. That does not 
begin to meet the marshalling burden it must carry." (Emphasis added.) Id. 
at 800. 
To the same effect is Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 58 
(Utah 2001) wherein this Court stated: 
". . . [Regarding Mrs. Campbell's fraud claim, it is clear that all State Farm 
has done in this appeal is to 'argue selected evidence favorable to its position.' 
. . . As we held in Crookston I c[t]hat does not begin to meet the marshalling 
burden [State Farm] must carry.'" Jd. at 58. 
Because Price Development did not begin to meet its marshaling burden, its appeal 
concerning the verdict on compensatory damages and punitive damages should be rejected. 
II. PRICE DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT APPEALED THE JURY VERDICT, 
AFFIRMED BY JUDGE NOEL, THAT PRICE BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES TO THE SMITHS, CONVERTED SMITHS' INTEREST IN 
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS, AND BREACHED ITS PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENTS, AND ACCORDINGLY, THOSE QUESTIONS ARE NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT IN THIS APPEAL. 
Appellate Rule 24(a)(5) requires that the appellants' opening brief include the 
Statement of the Issues presented for appeal. Price has not appealed the sufficiency of the 
evidence which overwhelmingly supports the jury's verdict and the Court judgment that 
Price breached its fiduciary duties to Smiths and converted Smiths' interest in the 
Partnership assets as well as Price's breaches of contract. Because Price has not appealed 
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the sufficiency of these determinations, they are not at issue in this appeal. V-l Oil Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Common., 942 P.2d 906, 910 atn . l l (Utah 1996); MacKav v. Hardy, 896 
P.2d 626, 628 atn.3 (Utah 1995). 
It follows under the precedent of this Court that each of the four issues actually raised 
by Price Development in its Statement of Issues must start from the premise that Price 
Development in fact breached its fiduciary duties, converted partnership assets belonging 
to Smiths and breached the Partnership Agreements. 
III. PRICE HAS MADE NO CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE 
EXCESSIVENESS OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD AND 
ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT WILL REVIEW THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT UNDER AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
STANDARD. 
1. Price Has Not Raised or Made a Constitutional Challenge. Appellate Rule 
24(a)(5) requires the appellant to set forth a "Statement of the Issues" presented for review, 
including the Standard of Review. Price has set forth its four Statement of Issues in its Brief 
@ 3 and none of those issues contain a constitutional challenge to the excessiveness of the 
jury's punitive damage award of $5.5 million in the case. Moreover, Rule 24(a)(6) requires 
the appellant to set forth verbatim with appropriate citation any "constitutional provisions" 
which are "determinative of . . . or of central importance to the appeal." Price states at page 
3 of its Brief: 
"There are no constitutional provisions or statutes whose interpretation is 
determinative or of central importance to this appeal." Id. at 3. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Accordingly, there is no federal or state constitutional challenge of the punitive 
damage award in this case and, therefore, no basis for the application of a de novo standard 
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of review as set forth in Cooper Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group. Inc.. 532 U.S. 
424 (2001) recognized by this Court in Campbell id. at 46. The U. S. Supreme Court stated 
in Cooper: 
"If no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in 
the federal system, is merely to review the trial court's 'determination under 
an abuse of discretion standard.'" Id. at 431 (Quoting from Browning-Ferris 
Inds.v. Kelco Disposal Inc.. 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989) (emphasis added)). 
This Court made it clear in Campbell after citing to Cooper, that a de novo review of a 
punitive damage award would be conducted by this Court only when it is "challenged on 
constitutional grounds." Id. at 46 (emphasis added). The Appellant in Campbell. State 
Farm, made it explicit in its appellant's brief under "Statement of Issues" and 
"Constitutional Provisions" that it was relying upon the U. S. Constitution amend. XIV and 
the Utah Const., art. 1, § 77 (See Addendum 12.) Accordingly, the review of excessiveness 
of the punitive damage award herein is under an abuse of discretion standard utilizing the 
factors set out in Crookston I 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR UNDER THE 
EGREGIOUS FACTS OF THIS CASE IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY. 
In Point II of its appeal, Price contends that Judge Noel committed reversible error, 
despite the iniquitous and brazen misconduct of Price, to have even submitted the issue of 
7Even with that, this Court in Campbell stated that because State Farm did not make an 
argument on the State Constitution provision, it declined to address that issue in the Court's 
decision: 
"Although State Farm indicates in its Statement of Issues section that it is 
challenging the punitive damage award under the Utah Constitution, it has not 
in fact made such an argument, and we do not discuss that issue." Id. at 46, 
n.8. 
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punitive damages to the jury and that this Court's review of that issue is under a de novo 
standard. Price is wrong on both counts. 
1. The Issue on Appeal of Whether the Trial Court Should Have Submitted to 
the Jury the Question of Punitive Damages is Reviewed Under an Abuse of Discretion 
Standard. Apparently relying on the U. S. Supreme Court holding in Cooper, Price 
contends that any trial court ruling as to punitive damages will be ipso facto, reviewed de 
novo by this Court. Price does not cite to any Utah case authority on point, turning only to 
an unpersuasive Tenth Circuit decision interpreting solely the substantive law of New 
Mexico.8 
The question of whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of Partnership assets demonstrating "willful 
and malicious conduct, or conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others," (Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983)), is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Crookston I 
at 804, 805. As this Court has stated: 
"When an appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient 
to support a jury's factual findings, 'we do not weigh the evidence de novo.' 
[citing authority] Rather, we follow one standard of review: We reverse only 
if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the 
appellant demonstrates that the findings lack substantial evidentiary support. 
. . . [citing Utah case authority, including Crookston I.]" 
Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keii 48 P.3d 888 (Utah 2002); see also Cruz v. 
Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) (superceded by statute on other grounds but cited with 
Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 170 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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approval in Campbell id. at 47). To the same effect, see the article on the applicable 
standard of review by Honorable Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review 
- Revised, vol. no. 8, 12 UT. B. J. at 8 (1999), cited and recommended with approval by this 
Court in Campbell id. n.7. 
2. In the Review of the Sufficiency of Evidence, Price Ignores a Pivotal Factor 
- It Was a Fiduciary. Price erroneously catalogs this case as an ordinary "business 
dispute." (App. Br. p. 3.) In fact, this "dispute" involves a fiduciary who intentionally, 
wantonly and recklessly breached and ignored its duties to two partners in order to enrich 
the fiduciary and its principal, Mr. Price. Nowhere does Price reference the classic 
definition by this Court of the trust, confidence and good faith which a general partner owes 
to its limited partner. In Nelson v. Matsch, 110 P. 865, 868 (Utah 1910), this Court 
declared: 
"Partners occupy a relation of trust and confidence . . . and in dealing with 
each other each is bound to disclose all material facts known to him and not 
known to the other. . . . Good faith not only requires that every partner should 
not make any false misrepresentations to his partners, but also that he should 
abstain from all concealments which may be injurious to the partnership 
business. " (Emphasis added) Id. at 868. 
Price had a fiduciary duty to disclose to Smiths the material facts relative to what Price was 
considering in forming its own REIT and transferring the Mall to the REIT. Price actively 
concealed and failed to give Smiths any information until long after the REIT was formed 
and the Partnership property was transferred; and, then when it did, Price deceived and 
misrepresented to its partners what the "allocated REIT value" was to the Mall and Smiths' 
Partnership interests. Price, while acting fully as a fiduciary for Smiths, voluntarily got itself 
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into a SEC registration to sell its own REIT stock to public investors for millions of dollars 
of personal profit to John Price and the Price principals, and claimed that on advice of 
counsel that it could not disclose to its partners, that their Partnership property was gone -
transferred and contributed to Price's REIT. But Price had a more fundamental and simple 
fiduciary duty before benefitting itself in a REIT stock sale on Wall Street - to apprise its 
partners (Smiths) as to what it was doing in expropriating Partnership assets. The jury and 
trial Court thought so. 
3. Regardless of the Standard of Review, the Evidence of Price's Breach of 
Trust and Confidence Was Overwhelming. Considering the facts in the light most 
favorable to Smiths, the overwhelming evidence, as discussed in detail under Point V herein, 
supports the trial Court's determination that Price's misconduct as a fiduciary was 
intentional, malicious and with knowing and reckless indifference and disregard of the 
Smiths' rights. Accordingly, the District Court properly submitted the issue of punitive 
damages to the jury. 
V. AS TO PRICE'S CLAIM OF EXCESSIVENESS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARDED, THE TRIAL COURT ARTICULATED GROUNDS UNDER 
CROOKSTON I IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARD WAS REASONABLE AND BORE A RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
TO PRICE'S MISCONDUCT. 
1. The Standard of Review of the Trial Court's Articulated Grounds is an 
Abuse of Discretion. After the jury returned its punitive damage verdict of $5,500,000, 
Judge Noel, one of the most experienced and respected trial judges in Utah, entered 5*/2 
pages of Special Findings, pursuant to the articulation rationale in Crookston L supporting 
and sustaining the jury verdict. Price claims that the punitive damage award was excessive 
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and that Judge Noel did not satisfy the Crookston 1 requirements. Price misconceives the 
standard of review and overlooks the detailed Findings of the District Court. 
Crookston I did not involve a constitutional challenge to the jury award, but rather 
came before the Court under U. R. C. P. 59 new trial analysis, providing the trial judge may 
order a new trial if the damages are excessive, appearing to having been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. Id. at 801. Under both Crookston I and IL this Court 
reviewed the trial court's new trial decision under an abuse of discretion standard, which 
gives considerable deference to the trial court.9 
2. Under Any Standard of Review, the Punitive Damage Award in this Case 
Was Not Excessive, and the Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion. Judge Noel 
considered all seven factors set forth in Crookston I, making the initial finding that the 
evidence demonstrated a "pattern of deceit, failure to disclose and misrepresentation" with 
respect to Price's misconduct regarding the REIT. This Court, in Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
959 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1998) indicated that with respect to the Crookston I factors, this 
Court's: 
"primary concern has not been with rigid application of the seven factors, but 
with how evidence as to these factors helps determine excessiveness." 
(Emphasis added). 
The evidence overwhelmingly supports the punitive damage award in this case under the 
Crookston I factors as set forth below. 
i. Relative Wealth of Price Development. In Campbell this Court "emphasize[d] there 
9Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937-40 (Utah 1993Y"Crookstonin; Crookston 
I at 807, 812. 
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is no pre-established mathematical formula" as to the proportionality of the punitive damage 
award to the defendant's wealth. Id. at 47-48. Judge Noel determined that there was 
substantial evidence that the net worth of Price was in excess of $37,000,000 with Price 
owning approximately $22,000,000 of JP Realty stock. Annual dividends to Price were 
between $1,580,000 and $2,513,000. Price had spent large sums of money on luxury and 
discretionary items, including operating expenses of $193,000 for the Price executive jet and 
$1,000,000 in art work. 
Given Price's extraordinary wealth and considering the additional millions that Price 
obtained in the formation of the REIT at Smiths' expense, together with the monies spent 
on luxury and the non-business expenses of an executive jet aircraft, a substantial punitive 
damage award was and is necessary to send a signal to Price and its owner, John Price, that 
society will not tolerate the deceit, misrepresentations, dishonesty, and avaricious conduct 
upon the part of a fiduciary. 
ii. Nature of Price's Misconduct. This factor specifically analyzes the defendant's 
misconduct in terms of "maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness."10 Campbell at 
48. Price operated the Partnership as if the North Plains Mall were Price's own fiefdom. 
In violation of the Partnership Agreements providing for a separate bank account, it 
"dumped" all the Mall's depositions and revenues into an account for the other Price's 
properties and partnerships, commingling the funds so that an accounting and financial 
10In BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
"[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award 
is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. As the court stated nearly 150 
years ago, exemplary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect 'the enormity of his 
offense.'" Id. at 575. (Emphasis added). 
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analysis became extremely difficult. Price violated its trust in paying itself unearned and 
excess management fees. It allocated substantial tax losses to John Price in 1992-93 of 
$1,452,342, while allocating to Smiths in the same years $491,450 in "phantom income." 
It secretly loaned money to the Development Partnership, it issued a "capital call" to Smiths 
and itself, and then accrued interest only to Price as though it were a loan. This was just the 
be ginning of an astonishing catalog of both deceitful and dishonest misconduct. 
Price had a problem in 1993 - its owner and CEO, John Price, had personal 
guarantees out for more than $94,400,000 relating to loans on numerous Price properties, 
including the Mall, as to which he had major, negative tax status. Many of the personal 
guarantees and loans were coming due in 1993-94. To eliminate those guarantees, preserve 
the preferred tax status in a tax-deferred exchange and sell John Price's equities in all of his 
commercial holdings in the stock market, the decision was made by Price in mid-1993 to 
form the JP Realty REIT. The REIT Prospectus (P-71) could not be clearer: 
"The Company [REIT] was formed to continue and expand the business, 
commenced in 1957, of certain affiliated . . . owned and controlled by John 
Price, Chairman and CEO of the Company." Id. at 1. 
Although the North Plains Mall was one of eight major malls which Price wanted to transfer 
to the REIT, John Price did not entirely own it. There was the interest of the Smiths. 
Moreover, as John Price expressly admitted, a transfer of the Mall to the REIT was not a 
Partnership purpose. Therefore, Price needed the consent of Smiths' 15% interest to make 
the transfer. But Price decided, that in light of the financial size and significance of the 
REIT, to "ignore" the Smiths and not even try to seek their consent. This was consistent 
with Price's view of the Mall being Price's own fiefdom. 
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So, Price engaged in a pattern of deceit, concealment and misrepresentation against 
Smiths from August 1993 to April 1994 at the highest levels of Price Development, 
specifically John Price and his primary officers. On July 18, 1993 Price advised the Smiths 
of the possibility of a formation by Price of a REIT and represented that Smiths had "3 
options" as to their 15% Partnership interests being either put in or kept out of the REIT, or 
purchased by Price at its fair market value. But then Price, in September or October 1993, 
secretly entered into a Contribution Agreement with itself, effectively, to convey the Mall 
to the JP Realty REIT. Price back-dated the Agreement to coincide with the first draft of a 
SEC Prospectus. The back-dated Agreement created a direct conflict of interest for Price, 
which was undisclosed to Smiths. But, that was merely the beginning of this sordid conduct. 
Smiths attempted to obtain information about their 3 options, and particularly the fair 
market value of their 15% interest in the Mall. Price refused to respond. When it did finally 
in December 1993, Mendenhall for Price submitted a "preliminary estimate" of a new 
concept called "the REIT value" that was foreign to and never a part of the Partnership 
Agreements or operations. Prior to December 1993, all Partnership valuations had been 
based upon fair market value, including an appraisal which Price, itself obtained for loan 
purposes in 1989 at $15,000,000. (P-31.) 
Smiths responded to Mendenhall's preliminary "REIT value" estimate by saying that 
it did not reflect fair market value. Mendenhall then wrote to Smiths on December 2, 1993 
suggesting that Smith consider finding a group who would buy the Mall. (P-65.) But the 
astonishing fact is that Mendenhall, acting as a fiduciary, did not disclose to Smiths that the 
Mall was already contributed to the REIT, that the "3 options" were no longer available and 
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that Smiths' 15% interest in the Mall was gone. 
Price claimed that it could not disclose the facts surrounding the REIT to Smiths on 
the advice of counsel, but that is just as irrelevant to a fiduciary as would be the advice of 
counsel to an embezzler to keep his conduct secret. Price had a prior, more primary and 
foundational fiduciary duty of trust and confidence to disclose and not to conceal or 
misrepresent to Smiths the material facts involving the Partnership property and business. 
When Price entered into the secret Contribution Agreement to itself to convey the Mall to 
the REIT, it had an overarching duty to disclose and not to conceal or misrepresent that fact. 
It conspicuously failed its duty. 
Throughout the balance of December and January 1994, Smiths continued their 
attempted to obtain Partnership information about their 3 options and the REIT. Price did 
not respond even when Mendenhall and Frazier called Mr. Smith on January 20, 1994, the 
day before Price proceeded to implement the JP Realty REIT through the public stock 
offering. Price had finally sent to Smiths on January 13 the last draft of the Prospectus (P-
71), but Smith did not understand the REIT structure as it related to the Mall and Smiths' 
3 options. While Mendenhall and Frazier initiated the January 20 call to discuss a further 
guarantee of a new loan, Smiths inquired about the effect of the REIT on their 3 options. 
Neither Mendenhall or Frazier responded. The REIT went public on January 21, 1994 at 
$17.50 per share, selling 11,300,000 shares for $193,000,000. 
In February and early March 1994, Smith continued to ask for information. Price's 
response came on March 8, 1994. Acting at the express direction of John Price and others 
of the Executive Committee, Mendenhall for Price wrote his March 8 letter containing 
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Price's "revised computation" and accounting of the "REIT value" of Smiths' 15% 
Partnership interests. The computation showed that the entire value of Smiths' 15% 
Partnership interests was $6 J60 based on 352 REIT units (or shares) at $17.50 per share. 
(P-82 p.2; See Addendum 7.) Deceitfully, the March 8 "revised computation" bore the date 
of January 12, 1994 but in fact it had only been prepared by Price a few days before March 
8, 1994. Further, the March 8 "revised computation" assessed the Mall with a liability of 
over $848,000 of the $18,000,000 that Price and the REIT had expended in the fees of Wall 
Street bankers and lawyers. 
The March 8 "revised computation" and accounting was intentionally deceitful 
dishonest and breached Price's duty of trust and confidence to Smiths for a number of 
reasons. Included is the fact that as of that date, Price had in its possession a January 12, 
1994 statement of the "REIT value" of the Mall prepared by Price's Wall Street bankers, 
which calculation put the Smiths' "REIT value" at $54,581.00 (based on 3,118.95 REIT 
shares). But that calculation was never disclosed by Price to Smiths, at any time in 1994. 
In addition, the March 8 letter was malicious, because it was an attempt by Price to 
intimidate and coerce these two small partners to accept the proposal rather than face a large 
New York Stock Exchange Company. 
Incredulous, Smith asked Mendenhall on March 16 if the 352 units was really correct. 
This time, Price's response was immediate - Mendenhall shot back a telefax stating that it 
was correct. Smith requested an urgent meeting with his general partner, which Price set in 
Salt Lake City for April 5, 1994. However, several days before the meeting, Price through 
Mendenhall, wrote to Smith advising that the "revised computation" of 352 REIT units 
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(having a value of $6,160) is "hereby withdrawn." At the April 5, 1994 meeting with 
Mendenliall and Frazier, Smith inquired about two of the "3 options" and in response, the 
Price executives disclosed to Smiths for the first time that the Mall had been contributed and 
transferred to the REIT back in September 1993 and that Smiths' options did not exist. It 
was not until 17 days later, that Price even allowed Smiths to see a copy of the back-dated 
Contribution Agreement of September 15. When Price transmitted it to Mr. Smith, they 
omitted and did not attach a copy of the "REIT value" computation of 20,793 units 
(3,118.95 to Smiths) attributed to the Mall by Price's Wall Street bankers. In point of fact 
Price never disclosed the 20,793 computation to Smiths until they were forced to do so 
during document discovery in this case in January 2000. after the matter had been pending 
for over 514 years. 
The benefits to John Price, who owned 99.9% of Price Development (.01% owned 
by Marsha Price), were sizable as a result of Price's fiduciary breach of trust and confidence: 
(1) it was falsely represented in the JP Realty Prospectus that Price owned the Mall when 
he did not; (2) the REIT was created with the elimination of over $94,400,000 of John 
Price's personal guarantees on outstanding loans, much of which were maturing in 1994; 
(3) John Price, who had a negative net value in the Mall of over $4,700,000 received a tax 
deferred transfer of stock in the REIT, having a total cash value of all his interests of over 
$63,000,000 (P-56, P-71 pp. 7-8); (4) John Price and a few other Price principals received 
over 475,000 shares in stock options in the REIT; (5) a John Price controlled entity received 
200,000 shares of Price Group Stock which allowed him to select two of the seven members 
of the REIT board of directors (P-71 p. 8); (6) and John Price became the equity owner of 
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19.4% of all the outstanding shares of the REIT after the public offering of 11,300,000 (P-
71 p. 65.). 
There can be no question that Price "cooked the Partnership books" in its March 8, 
1993 "revised computation" with its bogus accounting. It was intentionally deceitful, 
dishonest, and malicious, and was accompanied by what Judge Noel found to be a "pattern 
of deceit, dishonesty and misrepresentation" from September 1993 through April 1994. It 
was in wilful and wanton disregard of Smiths' Partnership interests. In breach of its duty 
of trust, Price ignored Smiths, then deceived them, then intimidated them, and then left them 
without any Partnership interests whatsoever. This reprehensible misconduct more than 
justified the punitive damages of $5.5 million awarded by the jury, as affirmed by the Court. 
(iii) Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Price's Misconduct. This third factor looks 
at the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct as to what the defendant knew and what 
was motivating its actions.11 Crookston I at 49. Price knew of its fiduciary duty of trust and 
confidence, knew of its obligations under the Partnership Agreements, knew that it had a 
conflict of interest (admitted in the offering Prospectus), knew that it had given Smiths the 
nPrice's argument repetitively made throughout its Brief, that it had no other options but to 
transfer the Mall to the REIT is an absolute falsehood. It plainly had other options. First, 
Price could have carried out its fiduciary duty, made full disclosure to Smiths, and sought 
Smiths' consent. Second, Price could have simply exercised the option to extend the 
Chemical Bank loan through July 15, 1994, and sought a long-term loan on the Mall without 
it being packaged with other Price mall properties. Third, it could have sold the Mall for its 
"fair market value in the market for $16 million, paid off the debt, and distributed the 
proceeds. Fourth, it could have dissolved and liquidated the Partnerships, paid off the debt, 
and distributed the assets to the partners, pursuant to the Partnership Agreements. What it 
could not do is what it did - breach its duty of trust and confidence and secretly convey the 
Partnership assets away from the Smiths. The jury and the Court fully heard Price's 
justification and excuse for what it did and rejected them. Price has not appealed that 
rejection. 
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"3 options" in July 1993, knew that thereafter in October 1993 it had contributed the Mall 
to itself for the REIT and knew that the Contribution Agreement was not an arms-length 
transaction. 
Price knew and intentionally concealed its action, the conveyance of the Mall in 
which Smiths, ipso facto, lost their Partnership interests, knew that March 8, 1994 REIT 
value was bogus, and knew that it had never made a disclosure or accounting to Smiths as 
to what was Price's actual computation of the "REIT value." much less what the fair market 
value of the Mall was as of January 1994. 
The facts as found by the jury and affirmed by Judge Noel, were that as of the date 
of the REIT, the fair market value of the Mall was $16,000,000, which translated to a net 
value to Smiths of their 15% Partnership interest of $149,004, plus the outstanding loan. 
Price knew and actively concealed from Smiths the millions of dollars that was to be made 
by Price and John Price in the formation of the REIT. Price's state of mind and indifference 
to the plight of Smiths was demonstrated by the testimony of John Price, himself. It was a 
bright line upon which the punitive damage award was returned by the jury and affirmed by 
the court. 
(iv) The Effect of Price's Misconduct on Smiths and Others, As a direct result of Price's 
flagrant misconduct, Armand Smith and Virginia Smith immediately and irrevocably lost 
their Partnership interests in the Mall in Clovis, N.M. Virginia Smith was required to 
borrow money just to meet the capital call. Smiths have exhausted themselves financially 
in this case without ever receiving a penny for Price's misconduct and misappropriation of 
their Partnership interests. They have been forced to pursue this legal battle against Price 
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whose principals, since January 1994, were simultaneously acting for JP Realty, a major 
New York Stock Exchange Company. Smiths financial and emotional damage has been 
severe, although they know they cannot recover for the latter. 
The investing public was also mislead and injured by the false statements in the REIT 
Prospectus as to Price owning the Mall and the "REIT value" allocated to the Mall. Price 
admitted that the capitalization rate used by Price on North Plains was a "backed-into" 
calculation and was not reflective of what the capitalization rate would have been. (R 4545 
@ 1166-67.) 
This factor supports the jury's award of very significant punitive damages. 
(v) Probability of Future Recurrences. This factor analyzes the likelihood that the 
defendant will repeat or continue in its wrongful behavior. Crookston I at 808. Price is and 
will be a recidivist unless punitive damages awarded by the jury and sustained by Judge 
Noel are affirmed. At no time has Price ever acknowledged any awareness of its egregious 
conduct. Even before this Court, while not appealing the jury findings of breach of fiduciary 
duty and conversion of Partnership assets, Price continues to pretend that it did nothing 
improper; indeed, its position is that its act of secretly conveying the Partnership assets away 
from Smiths was a noble gesture to attempt to avoid a fabricated bankruptcy. It states that 
even if it were assumed that Price "cooked the Partnership books" concerning the bogus 
accounting, charged dishonest management fees, and secretly transferred the Mall away from 
Smiths, Price maintains that no injury was done. (App. Br. @ 32-33.) Price continues to 
insist that Smiths "were simply not injured in any way" by any of Price's misconduct, (the 
jury findings of which it has not appealed). (App. Br. @ 33.) Perhaps the wealth and hubris 
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of Price explains this but the morality of the laws by which this Court and our society live 
will not. Unless the message of the jury as affirmed by the Court is sent to Price and its 
owner, it is likely that Price and its owner will engage in further "pattern of deceit, failure 
to disclose and misrepresentation." 
Price contends that there was no evidence that it engaged in other similar conduct. 
The answer to that is - who knows? What we do know is at the trial, Smiths attempted to 
call a Robert Springman, former Price Development limited partner and employee with 
respect to similar conduct in another Price partnership property conveyed to the REIT. 
Springman, an out-of-state witness, was not subject to subpoena power and was to appear 
voluntarily. However, Mendenhall for Price, upon hearing of Springman's possible 
appearance, telephoned Springman and told him that "he needed to make sure that he had 
all of his facts together before he testified. . ." (R 4542 @ 534.) Springman did not testify. 
vi. Relationship of the Parties. This Court, in Campbell stated: 
"This factor analyzes the relationship between the parties, specifically, the 
degree of confidence and trust placed in the defendant. The greater the trust 
. . . the more appropriate the imposition of a large punitive damage award for 
a breach of that trust. A breach of fiduciary relationship also supports a large 
punitive damage award. Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
Price was a fiduciary plain and simple. In that capacity, it engaged in the most deceptive, 
dishonest and secret conduct. It concealed a whole panoply of fiduciary breaches, treating 
Smiths as another ordinary business dispute. 
vii. Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages. In Campbell this Court made clear the 
rule with respect to the ratio factor: 
"The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not determinative. It is 
44 
simply one of the factors to be considered, none of which is more important 
or conclusive than another. . ." Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
In Campbell this Court explicitly approved a ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages of 56 to 1, and in Crookston IL this Court upheld a ratio of 5 to 1. In the instant 
case, the ratio is 3.3 to 1 (if attorneys' fees are considered as part of the compensatory 
damages) and 5 to 1 if they are not. Because the ratio of 3.3 to 1 approximates the ratio 
approved in Crookston I„ no excessiveness analysis is required. In any event, both ratios are 
well within the range previously approved by this Court. 
When all is said it comes down to this - what amount of punitive damages is required 
to send a signal, yet unheard, to Price that its reprehensible and brazen conduct will not be 
tolerated in our society? One or two million dollars? For that amount of punitives, it would 
be worth the risk for Price, or others in positions of power and wealth, to do the same thing 
again. Three to four million dollars, the answer is the same. Five to eight million dollars 
- Price might just get the signal. But it would take that sum. The punitive damages of 
$5,500,000 was a sum which the jury determined would send the message and it was 
affirmed by Judge Noel as "within the zone of reasonableness given the conduct of Price 
Development and the circumstances of the case." Judge Noel concluded that the punitive 
damage verdict: 
"clearly was not excessive or disproportionate as to suggest or evidence 
passion or prejudice of the jury." (R 4497.) 
The punitive damages of $5,500,000 was clearly not excessive and this Court should affirm 
the trial court in all respects. 
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VI. PRICE DEVELOPMENT'S NEW "CAUSATION" ISSUE FAILS BECAUSE 
(1) THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, (2) THE INJURY TO SMITHS 
WAS PLAINLY ESTABLISHED, (3) PRICE CONFUSES INJURY WITH 
DAMAGES AND (4) CITED CASE AUTHORITY IS INAPPOSITE. 
1. Causation Issue Was Not Preserved Below. For the first time in this case, Price 
raises a causation issue contending that Smiths did not prove that Smiths "suffered] any 
damages" caused by what Price erroneously labels "alleged" breaches of fiduciary duty and 
contract - transferring the Mall to Price's REIT. App. Br. @ 1, Issue 1. The absolute and 
unquestioned fact is that this "injury causation" issue was never raised before the trial Court 
at any time.12 As such, Price may not raise it for the first time on appeal. Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994); Ong IntT OJ.S.A.) v. 11th 
Ave. Corp, 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). The centerpiece of Price's argument at trial was 
that it never breached any fiduciary duties or partnership agreements and, accordingly, it 
never reached any issue of damage causation. That centerpiece argument was flatly rejected 
by the jury and Judge Noel on post-trial motions. (R 4501.) The jury verdict findings on 
these issues have not been appealed. 
2. In Any Event, Smiths Established Causation and Damages At Trial. If the 
Court were to proceed to review this new issue, Price cannot prevail in any event. Price not 
only misstates and confuses the issue of causation with damages, but also it erroneously 
argues that Smiths' evidence did not demonstrate proximate causation and damages 
stemming from Price's egregious conveyance of the Partnership assets to itself in the form 
12
 Smiths have made a detailed review of the motions and argument that Price raised before 
the District Court. It clearly demonstrates and Smiths unequivocally submit to the Court that 
Price did not raise the injury or causation question in the lower Court. 
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of the REIT. 
As to causation, there can be no debate on this case record, unlike the case Price cites, 
that the loss of Smiths' Partnership interests in the North Plains Mall was directly and 
proximately linked to Price's clandestine and deceptive breaches of fiduciary duty in 
transferring the Mall to itself in the form of the REIT. Smiths did not even know that Price 
had breached its fiduciary duty and converted partnership assets to its own benefit until long 
after the fact. At that time, March 8, 1994, Price "cooked its books" and offered to replace 
the Smiths' Partnership interests worth over $400,000 with 352 units in Price's REIT, 
having a value of $6,160. These two people from New Mexico had a contractually 
guaranteed Partnership interest in the Mall, which was directly and irrevocably taken from 
them by Price by what is now an admitted and unappealed breach of fiduciary duty and 
partnership conversion. Price's argument on causation does not come within even the 
shadow zone of correctness. See Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal. App. 2d 104, 119-20 (1965). 
As for damages, Price's argument is impossible in light of the plain testimony of 
Smiths' expert, Howden, who testified as to the fair market value of the Mall as of the date 
of the breaches of fiduciary duty and partnership agreements. As to Price's claim that such 
testimony does not demonstrate that the Mall would have sold for that value, this Court has 
long held that fair market value is established, as a matter of law, if the expert witness values 
the properly on the basis of the willing and knowledgeable buyer and seller in the market, 
neither being under the obligation to buy or sell as of the key date of value. State by Road 
Comm'n v.Noble. 335 P.2d 831, 834 (Utah 1959); see also Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) 
(1987). As this Court stated in State Rd Comm'n. v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917 (Utah 1963): 
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". . . The term 'market value' is the price which the land would bring between 
a seller who desired, but was not compelled, to sell, and a buyer who desired, 
but was not compelled, to buy." Id. at 918. 
It turns out that was not only the test of damages used by Howden and adopted by Merrill 
Norman for Smiths, but also it was the same test that was used by two Price value experts, 
Stephen D. Duplantis of Houston and Joshua S. Cannon of Albuquerque.13 Todd Neilson 
for Price then utilized those value estimates to calculate Smiths' zero Partnership value. The 
damage basis of fair market value was founded upon Judge Noel's unchallenged jury 
instruction. (R 3723.) Price's new proposition on appeal that Smiths had some further 
burden at trial of proving that a specific or particular buyer had to be standing in the wings 
on January 1994 prepared to pay $16,000,000 for the Mall, is unique and without precedent. 
3. Price Confuses Injury With The Quantum of Damages. In this new argument, 
Price makes a curious claim that the breaches of fiduciary duty and partnership conversion 
did not cause injury to Smiths because the evidence demonstrated that the "probabilities" 
were greater that Price Development had only one "option available" for the Mall - transfer 
in an "insider and closed transaction" to itself the REIT. In one breath, Price talks about 
causation and then the next breath about damages. (See, App. Br. @ 26-27.) In point of 
law, the Courts have made it clear that "there is, properly speaking, a material distinction 
between the two terms, in that injury means something done against the right of the party, 
producing damage, whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of 
the injury." Acculog. Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added; 
13Indeed, fair market value is ordinarily proved by expert testimony. State v. Ward, 189 P.2d 
113, 118 (concurring opinion) (Utah 1948). 
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citation omitted)). Price's argument is tantamount to saying that a general partner who 
embezzles money from his partners, in plain breach of his fiduciary duty, invests the money 
in the stock market because it appears to be a more probable financial option (particularly 
to him), then, may defend his embezzlement on the basis that his partners have not met some 
burden of disproving that the stock market was the better option. Price put that argument 
in the form of a defense to the jury and trial Court and lost. 
4. Price Cites To Inapposite Case Law. Price's new "causation" argument rests 
on an inapplicable decision, Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). In Mahmood, 
this Court concluded that where "consequential damages" were sought for breach of contract 
for Ross' failure to make payments under a settlement agreement, such breach did not cause 
Mahmood to lose his interest in his properly that he pledged as security for a loan Mahmood 
made to the parties' partnership. The case is quickly distinguished in both fact and law. 
Smiths' claims were for general damages only and not consequential. In the instant case, 
Price's brazen breach of fiduciary duty, denied, ipso facto. Smiths' Partnership interests. 
Price's argument fails and the judgment should be affirmed in all regards. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
COMPENSABLE DAMAGES FOR PRICE'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY INCLUDED THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY. 
1. In a Breach of Fiduciary Case, Courts Have Clearly Recognized that an 
Award of the Time Value of Money to the Plaintiff is Necessary to Prevent the 
Fiduciary from Profiting from Its Own Wrongdoing. Price argues that the jury award 
and court judgment of compensable damages, including $690,000 for the time value of 
money, constituted an improper award of traditional "prejudgment interest." Price is 
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mistaken. Judge Noel considered the issue carefully at trial and concluded: 
"Well it occurs to the court that this is a case of first impression in Utah. It 
appears to be an exception in a fiduciary duty context. And my feeling would 
be, after reviewing these [case authorities], that the Supreme Court would 
undoubtedly rule that if it can be shown that one has breached a fiduciary duty 
by misappropriating assets or money, that, in fairness and equity, they should 
be forced to account for that money as well as any profits or interest, gained 
by the use of the injured parly's money. And that element of damage sought 
in this case by the plaintiffs should be allowed in order to make the plaintiffs 
whole in event it is shown that there is a breach of a fiduciary duty." (R4539 
@ 98-99.) (See also Addendum 5.) 
The jury found that Price breached its fiduciary duties to the Smiths (a verdict that 
Price has not appealed herein), by taking and misappropriating the Mall by deceit, 
concealment, misrepresentation and a bogus accounting which was intentional, malicious 
and in willful and wanton disregard of Smiths' rights. It would be a cruel twist of equity and 
hypocrisy if Price, after this reprehensible misconduct, could profit and reap a windfall from 
the misuse of Smiths' Partnership interests for over 7 years - January 1, 1994 to late March 
2001. 
The ruling of Judge Noel has strong judicial support throughout the Country.14 The 
Illinois Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Wernick, 502 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (111. App. Ct. 
1st Dist. 1986) states the rationale for the rule: 
"[I]n situations such as the instant one involving a breach of fiduciary duty, 
14Price relies on a handful of inapposite cases to support its position. None of the cited cases 
involved an analysis of whether the time value of money may be awarded as an element of 
substantive damage in a breach of fiduciary duty case. Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 
1003, 1004 (Utah 1907) (unliquidated negligence claim); Corma v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 
1383 (Utah 1995) (bailment contract claim); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 
1991) (equitable restitution claim); Lafavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000) ("essentially a contract action"); Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 
228 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (unjust enrichment claim). 
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the law does not permit defendants to obtain the beneficial use of plaintiff s 
funds at no cost to the wrongdoer, and, in detennining the appropriate 
damages in such cases, courts have focused on making the plaintiff whole by 
placing him in a posture which assumes that he had the opportunity to utilize 
his funds in a reasonable manner." (Emphasis added.) (rationale aff d by 
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Estate of Wemick, 535 N.E. 2nd 876, 888 (111. 
1989). 
This principle is widely recognized.15 Many courts have awarded compound interest 
as the only means for fully compensating a party injured by a breaching fiduciary. See, e.g., 
Michelson v. Hamada, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 353 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 1994) (where 
defendant breached his fiduciary duty, citing "cases confirming] that an award of compound 
interest is appropriate in this type of case." Id at 353; Ryan v. City of Chicago, 654 N.E. 2d 
483, 486, 488 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) ("compound interest was required in order to 
make full equitable restitution" under pension code.); see also Restatement of Restitution 
§ 156cmt.bat 620 (1937). Price itself calculated compound interest in paying itself interest 
on Partnership loans. 
15Rolf v. Blvth Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 87 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("An award of 
prejudgment interest is in the first instance, compensatory, and is customary in cases 
involving breach of fiduciary duties."; Jefferson Naf 1 Bank v. Central Nafl Bank, 700 F.2d 
1143, 1155 (7th Cir. 111. 1983) (holding in breach of a fiduciary duty case that "a trustee who 
commits a breach of trust and incurs liability for a certain amount of money and the loss of 
income thereon is properly accountable not only for the return of the money but also interest 
actually received by him during the period."); Josephsonv. Marshall, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
10741 (S.D.N. Y. June 14, 2002) ("[T]he award of prejudgment interest is appropriate in 
breach of fiduciary duty cases."); McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 612, 633 
(E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Under Pennsylvania law, prejudgment interest is available for awards for 
breach of fiduciary duty."); Spanglerv. Jones, 861 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Tx. App. Dallas 1993) 
(A breach of fiduciary duty claim falls "within the category of claims for which equitable 
prejudgment interest maybe awarded.); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 355-56 (Me. 
1988) (If the jury on remand found that defendant violated his fiduciary duty, plaintiff could 
seek money damages for the amount he was wrongfully underpaid, with interest from the 
sale date to the judgment date.) 
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It is noteworthy that Price's brief does not cite a single case holding that a plaintiff 
cannot recover the time value of money as a substantive element of damages in a breach of 
fiduciary claim. Price implies that Smiths should not be able to recover the time value of 
money relating to its breach of fiduciary duty because the damages are not calculable with 
mathematical accuracy. (App. Br. @ 48.) Price's argument is misplaced.16 Price confuses 
traditional prejudgment interest with the time value of money as an element of damage 
resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty. The general rule in Utah is that damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty, as well as contract damages, need not be proven with absolute, 
mathematical precision, but are sustained if they are reasonably certain, utilizing accepted 
and traditional elements of damage. 
2. The Jury's Award of the Time Value of Money Was Not Excessive. Price 
Development argues that the jury's award of the time value of money should be reduced 
because it was purportedly $92,779 higher than the evidence presented at trial. Price's 
attempt to second guess the jury is wholly unfounded. 
As is plain from the face of Mr. Norman's damage analysis (P-173), no time value 
of money was allocated to the $30,000 of water rights Smiths contributed to the 
Development Partnership in 1990. The Court, however, instructed the jury regarding water 
rights: 
"However, you are now instructed that the Court will allow the Smiths to 
recover damages, if any, arising from the transfer of water rights to Price 
Development Company. You may award such damages by treatment of the 
water rights as additional equity to the partnership or as a loan from the 
Smiths. (R 3725, emphasis added.) 
16See, Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.5 at 173 (1973). 
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No appeal has been taken by Price to this Instruction. Based on this instruction and 
Mr. Norman's damage analysis, the jury plainly: (i) awarded Smiths the principal value of 
the contiibuted water rights in the amount of $30,000, and (ii) awarded the Smiths the time 
value of money on such principal amount. At the time of trial, Smiths had been deprived 
of the value of this $30,000 contribution for approximately 11 years. 
C O N C L (1 S 1 O N 
Based on the marshaled facts and the argument set forth herein, this Court should 
affirm in all respects the jury verdict and judgment of the District Court. Smiths should be 
awarded their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as part of the Court's affirmance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated: September 27, 2002 
ROBERT S. CAN 
CLARK K. TAYLOR 
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Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
The above-referenced case came on for trial by jury on Monday, the 26th day of March 
2001, before the HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, Presiding Third District Court Judge, on the 
claims of the Plaintiffs (sometimes the "Smiths" herein) for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract, conversion of partnership property, and punitive damages, as well as the defendants1 
tiai3<H> 
Price Development Company (n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc.) claim for declaratory judgment, the 
Plaintiffs appearing through and being represented by their attorneys of record, Robert S. 
Campbell and James E. Magleby of Salt Lake City and the Defendants appearing through and 
being represented by their counsel of record, Reed L. Martineau and Rex E. Madsen of Salt 
Lake City. 
A jury of eight persons with One alternate juror having been selected and empaneled by 
the Court to try the issues of fact, opening statements were made and evidence and testimony 
thereafter received on March 26,2001 and continuing for 14 court trial days, during which time 
witnesses were sworn and testified, and documents were received by the Court. The parties, 
pursuant to stipulation, reserved the issue of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party as provided 
by Article 19 of the Partnership Agreements to be resolved by the Court after the return the 
jury's special verdict. 
On Wednesday, April 11,2001, both sides having rested their cases, the Court charged 
the jury as to the law to be applied to the evidence with respect to whether Price Development 
Company had breached its fiduciary duty to the Smiths, whether Price Development Company 
had breached its contract with the Smiths, and if so, whether Price Development Company had 
converted partnership assets and the damages, if any, sustained by the Smiths as a proximate 
cause or consequence of Price Development's conduct as well as whether punitive damages 
should be entered against Price Development Company and in favor of the Smiths. Closing 
argument was presented on the same day, April 11, 2001 and at approximately 3:10 p.m., the 
jury retired to deliberate on their special verdict. 
At approximately 7:05 p.m. on said 11th day of April, 2001, the jury returned into open 
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Court the following Special Verdict: 
"SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY 
1. Did the defendant, Price Development Company, breach the partnership 
agreements, as alleged by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Did the defendant Price Development Company, breach its fiduciary duties, as 
alleged by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If the answer to this question is "No," 
do not answer Question No. 3. 
3. Was Price Development Company's breach of fiduciary duty a proximate cause 
of any damages sustained by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Did the defendant Price Development Company, convert property belonging to 
plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. If you answered either Question Nos. 1,3, or 4 "Yes," then state the total amount 
of all damages, if any, sustained by all plaintiffs together. 
DAMAGES: $ 410,000 (Not including time value of money 
or "interest.") 
DAMAGES due to time value of money or "interest." 
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$ 690,000 
6. Should punitive damages be awarded against Price Development Company and 
in favor of the Smiths? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
Dated this 11 t h day of April 2001. 
Ashley James Anderson 
Foreperson" 
The Court having received and entered the Special Verdict of the Jury, thereupon 
proceeded with the punitive damage phase of the case, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
onthefollowing morning, Thursday, April 12,2001. Testimony and evidence were received with 
respect to the wealth and financial position of the defendant, Price Development Company, 
further closing arguments were made by counsel for the respective parties, and the jury 
thereupon retired to consider its Special Verdict on Punitive Damages. 
At approximately 12:05 p.m. on said day, April 12, 2001, the jury returned into open 
Court its Special Verdict Re Punitive Damages as follows: 
"MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
What amount of punitive damages should be awarded against Price 
Development Company? 
$ 5.500.000 
Dated this 12th day of April, 2001. 
Ashley James Anderson 
Foreperson" 
The Court thereupon received the Special Verdict on Punitive Damages and entered it 
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upon the records of the Court. No party asked for the jury to be polled and the jury panel was 
thereupon dismissed and the Court adjourned with counsel for the Plaintiffs being requested to 
prepare the form of judgment. 
The Court being now fully advised as to all and singular the law and fact in the premises, 
having concluded that the Special Verdict of the Jury and the Special Verdict Re Punitive 
Damages were duly and properly returned, and having entered Special Findings of the Court 
determining that there was evidence for the jury from which it could reasonably conclude that 
the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was justified under the facts and 
circumstances, which Special Findings should be annexed to and made a part of the Judgment, 
and that a Judgment should be thereupon entered upon said Verdicts in favor of the Smith 
Parties and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion of partnership property, breach of contract and punitive damages and 
that Price Development Company's claim for declaratory judgment should be denied and hence 
dismissed, and that the Court, pursuant to agreement and stipulation of the parties, has 
determined the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to Smiths as the prevailing party under 
Article 19 of both North Plains Development Partnership and the North Plains Land Partnership 
and as the prevailing party on the breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good cause shown, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
I. THAT on the Special Verdict of the jury for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract and conversion of the partnership property, judgment be, and the same 
is hereby entered, in favor of Armand L. Smith, individually and as Trustee for 
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the Armand L. Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia 
L. Smith and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in 
the sum and amount of $1,100,000.00, inclusive of $690,000.00 due to the time 
value of money or interest on the breach of fiduciary duty claims; 
II. THAT on the Special Verdict of the Jury Re Punitive Damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty, judgment be, and the same is hereby entered, in favor of Armand 
L Smith, individually and as Trustee for the Armand L Smith, Jr. Trust and the 
Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia L. Smith and against Price 
Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in the sum and amount of 
$5,500,000.00; 
III. THAT the combined and total judgment of $6,600,000.00 be and the same shall 
bear interest from the date of the judgment as provided by law; 
IV. THAT the Plaintiffs, Smith Parties, be and they are hereby entitled to an award 
of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as the prevailing party under Article 19 
of the partnership agreements and under their claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Court has considered the attorney fee application of $517,611.40 submitted 
by the Smith Parties, the affidavit submitted in support of the application by 
Carmen K. Kipp, Esq., and the other papers submitted by both parties on the 
issue of attorney fees. Based on these submissions, the Court finds and 
concludes as follows: 
a. That Price Development has not contested that the Smiths are entitled 
to recover attorney fees and costs underthe partnership agreements and 
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for their breach of fiduciary duty claims; 
b. That Price Development has not contested the Smiths Parties' attorney 
fee application to the extent it seeks $457,544.44, and thus this amount 
of attorney fees are reasonable. Independently, the Court finds these 
fees and costs are reasonable under the factors set forth in Dixie State 
Bank and as established by the uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp, 
Esq. 
c. That the Smith Parties are also entitled to recover attorney fees and 
costs in the amount of (i) $34,000.00 for time spent on this case by lead 
trial counsel, Robert S. Campbell; (ii) $22,534.16 for attorney fees and 
costs incurred from the Snell & Wilmer law firm; and (iii) $3,522.88 for 
attorney fees and costs incurred from the Leverick & Musselman law 
firm. The Court further finds these attorney fees and costs are 
reasonable and consistent with the factors to be considered under Dixie 
State Bank, other controlling precedent, the additional factors set forth in 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and as established by the 
uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp, Esq. 
d. That Judgement be and is hereby entered in favor of Armand L. Smith, 
individually and as trustee and Virginia L. Smith and against Price 
Development Company, n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for and in the amount 
of $517,611.40 as reasonable attorney fees and $7,133.26 for 
reasonable costs and expenses; 
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V. THAT the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs and expenses of Court, as provided 
by law; 
VI. THAT Defendants, Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. shall 
take nothing by its claim of declaratory judgment, and the said claim be and the 
same is hereby dismissed, no cauj^pitfKJjjgn, with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ if day of June, 20$ 
;RANKG. 
Presiding District 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY 
Attorneys for Armand L. Smith and 
Virginia L. Smith, et al. 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
REX E. MADSEN 
Attorneys for Price Development Company 
n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc., et al. 
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Op SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9598 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith 
Deputy Clerk 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY 
Ballard Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARMAND l_ SMITH, Individually and as 
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr. 
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham 
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX 
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND 
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL FINDINGS OF $ 
THE COURT ON 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY 
Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
Pursuant to the precedent of the Utah Supreme Court in Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991), the Court herewith makes and enters Special 
Findings of Fact with respect to the punitive damage award returned by the jury in the above-
referenced case on the 11th and 12th days of April, 2001, as follows: 
The jury empaneled in this case returned into open Court a verdict of 
compensatory damages on April 11,2001 of $1,100,000 and answered "Yes" to 
the question of whether punitive damages should be awarded against Price 
Development Company and in favor of the Smiths. 
On the following day, April 12,2001, the jury returned into open Court a verdict 
finding that the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Price 
Development Company was $5,500,000. 
With respect the jury's verdict of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of 
partnership property by Price Development Company, there was substantial 
substantive evidence before the jury upon which a punitive damage award of 
$5,500,000.00 is considered reasonable. 
The jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence a pattern of deceit, 
failure to disclose and misrepresentation with respect to the three "options" which 
Price Development personnel discussed with Armand Smith relative to formation 
by Price Development of a real estate investment trust To that end, there was 
substantial evidence: 
that Price Development failed to disclose to the Smiths that the 
Contribution Agreements were executed by Price Development in late 
September or October 1993, in which Price Development agreed to 
convey the North Plains Mall Property to another Price entity, Price 
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, for the benefit 
of the JP Realty REIT; 
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that said disclosure should have been made during the month of 
September, October or November, 1993, but was not made even in early 
December 1993 when Price Development submitted to Smiths a 
"preliminary estimate" of the "REIT value" of the North Plains Mall; 
that the Contribution Agreement was not disclosed to the Smiths by Price 
Development until April 1994, nearly three months after the formation of 
the JP Realty REIT; 
that Price Development did not disclose to Smiths until March 1994 that 
they no longer had options with respect to their 15% interest of the North 
Plains Mall being kept out of the REIT, or such interest being purchased 
at the fair market value thereof; 
that the letter of March 8,1994 setting forth "an original computation" and 
a "revised computation" of the Smiths' interest in the allocated REIT 
value of the North Plains Mall was false, misleading and deceitful; 
that Price Development Company did not want the Smiths to interfere by 
filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit priorto January 21,1994 when 
the J. P. Realty REIT was created, established and implemented; 
that the March 8,1994 "revised calculation" of 312 units was intentionally 
misleading and was in wanton disregard of the partnership rights of the 
Smiths in the North Plains Mall Property; 
that Price Development Company never made an accurate accounting 
to the Smiths as to Price Development's own calculation of the "REIT 
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value" of the Smiths' interest until the year 2000, after nearly six years of 
litigation brought by Smiths to obtain an accounting and relief for breach 
of fiduciary duty; 
Price Development paid itself, as general partner, excessive fees beyond 
that clearly set forth in the Partnership Agreements; 
Price Development failed to maintain a separate bank account for the 
North Plains Mall Partnerships, co-mingling all funds from all Price owned 
properties and making it difficult to isolate and allocate revenues, costs, 
expenses and net income of the North Plains Mall Property; 
that Price Development accrued to itself interest on monies it advanced 
to the Partnerships, which it referred to as capital call contributions, but 
did not pay or accrue to the Smiths interest on their proportionate capital 
call contributions; 
that the Smiths were never advised by Price Development, as general 
partner, of the potential conflicts which it and the Price principals had with 
respect to the conveyance of the North Plains Mall Property from Price 
Development Company to Price Development Company, a Maryland 
limited partnership, for the benefit of the JP Realty REIT; 
that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found 
that the conduct of Price Development Company in this case was 
intentional and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Smiths. 
that the wealth of Price Development Company was reasonably in 
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excess of $37,000,000 as of the end of December 1999. 
- that the punitive damage award of the jury in this case of $5,500,000 was 
within the zone of reasonableness given the conduct of Price 
Development and the circumstances of the case and clearly v/as not 
excessive or disproportionate as to suggest or evidence passion or 
prejudice of the jury; 
Dated this ^ Cfday of June, 2001. 
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NORTH PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
NPD 
Partnership Agreement 
The Partnership is hereby authorized to engage in such 
activities as may be incidental to the purposes stated hereinabove 
and to engage in such other related businesses as may be mutually 
agreed upon by the Partners. 
ARTICLE 6 
TITLE TO ASSETS AND BANK ACCOUNTS 
All real and personal property of the Partnership shall be 
held in the name of the Partnership. All funds of the Partnership 
shall be deposited in a separate bank account or accounts in the 
name of the Partnership and may be withdrawn upon the signature 
of the General Partner or such other person or persons as may be 
designated in writing by the General Partner. 
ARTICLE 7 
MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND LEASING; REIMBURSEMENT 
Section 7.1 General. The General Partner shall have the 
right and duty of managing the business of the Partnership, 
including the duty of enforcing all of the obligations owed by 
third parties to the Partnership and the General Partner shall 
devote so much of its time, efforts, personnel, and resources to 
the business and affairs of the Partnership as may be required 
for the successful and profitable conduct thereof. Except as 
limited in this Agreement, the General Partner shall have the 
exclusive control over the business of the Partnership including 
the power to assign duties, hire personnel, enter into contracts 
and leases, borrow money, refinance, encumber or sell all or any 
part of the property, and to have full authority and control of 
any and all business operations of the Partnership at the expense 
of the Partnership. 
Section 7 .2 Ground Lease. The Partnership shall enter into 
a Ground Lease of Project site with North Plains Land Company, a 
Utah limited partnership. The Ground Lease shall be in the form 
of that attached hereto as Exhibit "BM and by this reference made 
a part hereof. The form and content of the Ground Lease is 
hereby approved by the Partners. 
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Section 7.3 Management Agreement. The Partnership shall 
enter into a Management Agreement with Price Management Company, 
a Utah corporation. The Management Agreement shall be in the 
form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this reference 
made a part hereof. The form and content of the Management 
Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited 
Partners hereby waive any claim respecting said Management 
Agreement arising out of the existing affiliation between the 
General Partner and Price Management Company. 
Section 7.4 Development Agreement, The Partnership shall 
enter into a Development Agreement v/ith Price Development Company, 
a Utah corporation. The Development Agreement shall be in the 
form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference 
made a part hereof. The form and content of the Development 
Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited 
Partners hereby waive any claim respecting said Development 
Agreement arising out of Price Development Company's status as 
the General Partner hereunder. 
Section 7.5 Leasing Agreement. The Partnership shall also 
enter into a Leasing Agreement with Price Development Company. 
The Leasing Agreement shall be in the form of that attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The form and content of the Leasing Agreement is hereby approved 
by the Partners and the Limited Partners hereby waive any claim 
respecting said Leasing Agreement arising out of Price Develop-
ment's status as General Partner hereunder. 
Section 7.6 Limited Partner Approval. The Limited Partners 
shall not have nor exercise any management right whatsoever 
except as herein provided. The General Partner, however, shall 
not, without the written consent or ratification by ninety 
percent (90%) in interest of the Limited Partners do any of the 
following acts: 




2. Confess a judgment against the Partnership. 
3. Possess Partnership property, or assign specific 
Partnership property, for other than a Partnership purpose. 
4. Except as otherwise provided in Articles 12 and 
13, admit a person or entity as a General Partner. 
The dissolution or withdrawal of a General Partner shall not 
dissolve the Partnership and in such event the Partnership may be 
continued by any then remaining General Partner(s) or by a person 
or entity selected by unanimous agreement of the Limited Partners, 
if there is not then a remaining General Partner. 
Section 7.7 Management Compensation; Reimbursement. The 
General Partner shall receive as compensation for its services as 
manager of the Partnership affairs, (i) reimbursement for any and 
all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the General Partner on 
behalf of the Partnership and (ii) a reasonable hourly rate of 
compensation for the time devoted by the General Partner's 
various personnel in furthering the Partnership's business, not 
to exceed, however, a rate of compensation which would be charged 
by third parties for performing similar services. In no event, 
however, shall the General Partner or its affiliates be compen-
sated hereunder for any services which are covered by the agree-
ments described in Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 (so long as such 
agreements remain in effect) except to the extent set forth in 
such agreements . 
Section 7.8 Conflict of Interest. 
(a) The General Partner, the Limited Partners, and 
their respective affiliates (including the respective directors, 
officers, and employees of each) may engage for their own account 
and/or for the account of others in other business ventures, 
including the purchase, development, operation, management, or 
syndication of real estate properties, either for their own 
respective or collective accounts or on behalf of other persons, 
partnerships, joint ventures, corporations, or other entities in 
which they may have an interest, whether or not competitive with, 
or in a conflict of interest position with, the Partnership. If 
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ship interests of the Curing Parties, and all rights granted 
hereunder to Curing Parties may be exercised severally and 
individually by each of such Curing Parties. 
Section 9.3 Repayment of Loans. The Partnership shall not 
repay anv loans made by the Partners or make any distributions tc 
the Partners except as hereinafter provided. Before any portion 
of such loans are repaid or any other distributions are made to 
the Partners, all expenses of operation shall be paid, all 
amounts currently due at such time on outstanding loans from 
persons other than the Partners shall be paid, and adequate 
provision shall be made for the working capital requirements of 
the Partnership, including adequate reserves for maintenance, 
management, promotion, and tax expenses. One hundred percent 
(100%) of all cash becoming available for distribution to the 
Partners shall be paid to the Partners in repayment of their 
loans to the Partnership until such loans have been repaid in 
full. All other distributions shall be made to the Partners in 
proportion to their ownership interests. 
Section 9.4 Interest on Loans to Partnership. Any funds 
loaned to the Partnership by a Partner, or advances on behalf of 
the Partnership by a Partner, shall be repaid to such Partner by 
the Partnership as provided for in Sections 9.2 and 9.3. Such 
loans or advances shall bear interest at the rate of two (2) 
percentage points (or three and one-half percentage points [34*) 
in the case of a loan arising pursuant to Section 9.2(d)) over 
the then existing prime rate of interest charged by Valley Bank & 
Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah; provided, however, in no 
event shall the rate of such interest exceed the maximum rate 
permitted by law. 
Section 9.5 Notice of Borrowings. The General Partner 
shall advise the Limited Partners of any significant borrowings 
by the Partnership. The General Partner shall also not enter 
into any agreement for recourse permanent financing or the 
guarantee of permanent financing either by the General Partner as 
NPD 
Partnership Agreement 
an individual or in its General Partner capacity without first 
notifying the Limited Partners and affording them the opportunity 
to become obligated for the repayment of such financing. 
ARTICLE 10 
ACCOUNTING 
Section 10.1 Supervision. Proper and complete books of 
account of the business of the Partnership shall be kept by or 
under the supervision of the General Partner at the principal 
management offices of the Partnership and shall be open to 
inspection or audit by any Limited Partner or by its accredited 
representative at any reasonable time during normal business 
hours. Any expense for such audit or review shall be borne by 
the Partner making such audit or review. 
Section 10.2 Accounting Records; Annual Financial Statement. 
The Partnership records shall be maintained using such method of 
accounting as the General Partner may select in accordance with 
accounting principles commonly used in the industry and in a form 
approved by the General Partner. Within ninety (90) days after 
the end of each fiscal year, the General Partner shall furnish to 
the Limited Partners financial statements for the year just 
expired. The books and records of account shall be used by the 
General Partner's accounting personnel and/or a firm of indepen-
dent public accountants selected by the General Partner, to 
prepare such financial statements, which shall be prepared in 
accordance with accounting principles commonly used in the 
industry. 
Section 10.3 Tax Returns. The General Partner shall 
prepare the Partnership's federal and state tax returns. The 
General Partner agrees to use its best efforts to cause said 
returns and related tax information to oe furnished to the 
Partners on or before April 1 of each calendar year. For purposes 
of this Article 10, the fiscal year of the Partnership shall be 
the calendar year. 
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Section 11.3 Profit and Loss. The term Profit and Loss 
shall mean the profits and losses of the Partnership as determined 
by the General Partner's accounting personnel and/or the account-
ing firm, if any, employed by the Partnership for the preparation 
of the financial statements referred to in Section 10.2. 
Section 11.4 Taxable Met Income. The term "Taxable Net 
Income" shall mean the net income or net loss of the Partnership 
as determined by the General Partner at the close of each fiscal 
year and reported on the Partnership information tax return filed 
for federal income tax purposes. The rate and method of deprecia-
tion to be utilized by the Partnership shall be determined by the 
General Partner and each Partner's share of the Taxable Net 
Income as reported on the Partnership tax returns shall be 
prorated among the Partners in accordance v/ith their respective 
ownership interests. 
Section 11.5 Distribution. Distributions of Net Spendable 
shall be made to the Partners within thirty (30) days after the 
end of each fiscal quarter of the Partnership or at the end of 
each such other period of time as the General Partner shall 
determine. In no event, however, shall distributions of Net 
Spendable be made less often than once per fiscal year. 
Section 11.6 Applications of Proceeds of Capital Transac-
tions . The net proceeds of a sale, condemnation, or other 
disposition of all or any part of the property of the Partnership, 
the net proceeds of any borrowing by the Partnership in excess of 
the capital requirements of the Partnership, and any insurance 
proceeds in excess of the costs of restoration, shall be distri-
buted to the Partners in proportion to each respective Partner's 
ownership interest. 
ARTICLE 12 
ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL PARTNERS 
The Partners recognize that it may be necessary or desirable 
to admit additional partners, limited cr general, to the Partner-
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management office of the Partnership is located and shall cause 
such recorded Certificate or amendment or a certified copy 
thereof to be recorded in the office of the appropriate governmen-
tal official in each county in which the Partnership has a place 
of business or owns real property. 
ARTICLE 19_ 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
In the event of any legal proceeding involving the interpreta-
tion or enforcement of the rights or obligations of the Partners 
hereunder, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to 
recover its reasonable attorneys' f§es and costs. 
ARTICLE 20 
NOTICES 
Ail notices, statements, demands, or other communications 
(herein referred to as "notices") to be given under or pursuant 
to this Agreement shall be in writing, addressed to the Partners 
at their respective addresses as provided in Article 1 and shall 
be delivered in person or by certified or registered mail, 
postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by telegraph or 
cable, charges prepaid. Any such notice shall be deemed given 
only upon actual delivery to the addressee of such notice or upon 
the date of refusal to accept such delivery by such addressee. 
Any Partner may from time to time change its address for receipt 




No Partner shall have the right to partition any property of 
the Partnership during the term of this Agreement nor shall any 
Partner make application to any court or authority having juris-
diction in the matter or commence or prosecute any action or 
proceeding for partition or the sale thereof and, upon any breach 
H. Order on Pre-Trial Motion 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 2 2001 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith 
„_£f UKKB COUNTY Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually and as 
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr. 
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham 
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
and Defendants, 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX 
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND 
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a 






Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
A number of pretrial motions, including motions for partial summary judgment filed by both 
parties, came on regularly for hearing before the Court, the HONORABLE FRANK E. NOEL, 
Presiding District Judge, on Tuesday, March 13, 2001, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom S45 of the 
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Matheson Court House in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs and Defendants Armand 
L. Smith, individually and as Trustee and Virginia L. Smith ("Smiths"), being represented by their 
counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. of Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell of Salt Lake City, 
Utah and the Counterclaim Defendants and Plaintiffs, Price Development Company et al. ("Price 
Development") being represented by their counsel, Rex E. Madsen of Snow Christensen and 
Martineau of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Specifically, the following motions were before the Court for determination: 
SMITHS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Motion in Limine to Exclude the Purported Expert Witness, Andrew S. Oliver 
2 Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Alan L. Gosule, Esq. 
3 Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Preclude the Purported Expert 
Testimony of R. Todd Neilson 
4 Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Report and 
Purported Expert Testimony of Lawrence S. Kaplan 
5 Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment That, as a Matter of 
Law, Both Partnership Agreements Required Consent of the Smiths' Interests for 
Price Development Company to Assign and Transfer the Partnership Real Property 
to the REIT 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence 
Concerning Penalty Provision of Partnership Agreements 
7 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Damages 
8 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and 
Testimony of Merrill Norman 
9 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and 
Testimony of John Howden 
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10 Price Development Company' Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence 
Concerning Loss of Purchasing Power 
11 Price Development Company's Motion for Declaratory and Partial Summary 
Judgment 
The Court, having received and considered the above-noted motions, the memoranda and 
supporting materials submitted by the respective Parties, and having weighed and considered oral 
argument of respective Counsel, and for good cause shown, hereby ORDERS: 
1. That the Smiths' motion for partial summary judgment (motion no. 5 above) is 
DENIED. 
2. That the Smiths' motions in limine to exclude the expert witness reports and 
testimony of Price Development's witnesses Andrew S. Oliver, Alan L. Gosule, R. 
Todd Nielsen, and Lawrence S. Kaplan (motion nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 above), are 
GRANTED IN PART, in that the Court rules that the measure of damages for the 
Smiths' breach of contract claims are as a matter of law based upon the Fair Market 
Value of the Smiths' partnership interests, and the "REIT value" is not relevant to 
this measure of damages. The remaining issues raised in the motions in limine, 
including whether and how the REIT value is admissible with regard to the Smiths' 
breach of fiduciary duty claims,, are taken under advisement, and the Court will rule 
on the admissibility of the reports and / or testimony at the time of trial, based upon 
the development of the evidence. 
3. That Price Development's motion for declaratory partial summary judgment (motion 
no. 11 above) is DENIED. 
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4. That Price Development's motions in limine regarding damages and to the exclude 
the expert report of John Howden (motion nos. 7 and 9 above) are withdrawn by 
Price Development, in light of the Court's denial of Price Development's motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
5. That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the Article IX clause, 
designated by Price Development as the "penalty provision" of the partnership 
agreements (motion no. 6 above) is GRANTED. 
6. That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the loss of purchasing power 
(motion no. 10 above) is taken under advisement. 
7. That Price Development's motion in limine to exclude the expert witness report and 
testimony of the Smiths' witness Merrill Norman (motion no 8 above), is reserved, 
and the Court will rule on the admissibility of the report and/or testimony at trial, 
based upon the development of the evidence. 
DATED this j S / 2 r d a y of March, 2001. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
HonoraEle Frank E. Noel X 
Presiding State District Judge 
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ORDER REGARDING TIME 
VALUE OF MONEY ISSUES 
Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
The issue of whether newly aligned Plaintiffs, Armand L. Smith, Virginia L Smith and 
related Trust Interests (collectively "the Smiths") may seek damages for the time value of money 
on their various claims was argued to the Court, the HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, Presiding 
0 0 3 
District Judge, on Monday, March 26, 2001, at approximately 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom S45 of the 
Matheson Court House in Salt Lake City, Utah. Arguing for the Smiths was their counsel, Robert 
S. Campbell, Jr. of Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell of Salt Lake City, Utah and arguing 
for the realigned Defendants, Price Development Company etal. ("Price Developmenf) was their 
counsel, Rex E. Madsen of Snow Christensen and Martineau of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Before the Court was Price Development's Motion in Limine RE: Exclusion of Evidence 
Concerning Loss of Purchasing Power and the related issue of whether the Smiths could present 
evidence regarding the time value of money in connection with their claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, and a payment of approximately $230,000 which was made by the Smiths to the North Plains 
Partnerships in 1989. 
The Court, based upon the pleadings and papers on file with the Court having been 
received and considered, the memoranda and supporting materials submitted by the respective 
parties, having weighed and considered oral argument of respective counsel, and for good cause 
shown, hereby ORDERS: 
1. That Price Development's motion to exclude evidence of interest as damages on 
the Smiths' breach of contract claims is GRANTED; 
2. That the Smiths' request to present evidence as to the time value of money on the 
$230,000 payment made by the Smiths to the North Plains Partnerships in 1989, 
is GRANTED; 
3. That the Smiths' request to present evidence as to the time value of money on their 
breach of fiduciary duty claims is GRANTED. 
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BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding State District Jud 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
•>j£u~ 
ROBERT S. CAMP 
of and for 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith 
REED L MARTINEAU 
REX MADSEN 
of and for 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants 
Price Development Company, n/k/a 
Fairfax Realty, Inc.. North Plains Land Company. Ltd.. 
and North Plains Development Company. Ltd. 
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6. JP Realty Prospectus 
No dealer, salesperson or other individual has 
been authorized to give any information or to 
make any representations not contained in this 
Prospectus in connection with the Offering cov-
ered by this Prospectus. If given or made, such 
information or representations must not be relied 
upon as having been authorized by the Company 
or the Underwriters. This Prospectus does not 
constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an 
offer to buy, any of the securities covered by this 
Prospectus in any jurisdiction where, or to any 
person to whom, it is unlawful to make such offer 
or solication. Neither the delivery of this Prospec-
tus nor any sale made hereunder shall, under any 
circumstances, create any implication that there 
has not been any change in the facts set forth in 
this Prospectus or in the affairs of the Company 
since the date hereof. 
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PROSPECTUS SUMMARY 
I The following summary is qualified in its entirety by the more detailed information and the 
financial information and statements, and the notes thereto, appearing elsewhere in this Prospectus. 
Unless indicated otherwise, the information contained in this Prospectus assumes (i) the transactions 
detailed under "The Company—Formation of the Company" have been completed, (ii) that the 
Underwriters' over-allotment options are not exercised, (Hi) that all PDC Units exchangeable for 
Common Stock have been exchanged and (iv) that no stock options for Common Stock have been 
exercised. All references to the "Company" in this Prospectus shall be deemed to include the Company 
and its subsidiaries as described herein, unless the context otherwise requires. All references in this 
Prospectus to "gross leasable area" or "GLA " shall refer to the Company-owned leasable area within 
the Company's properties and "total gross leasable area" or "Total GLA " shall refer to the GLA plus 
any tenant-owned leasable area within the Company's properties. See "Glossary" for the definition of 
certain other terms used in this Prospectus. 
The Company 
JP Realty, Inc. (together with its subsidiaries, the "Company") is a fully integrated real estate 
company primarily engaged in the ownership, leasing, management, operation, development, redevelop-
ment and acquisition of retail properties in Utah, Idaho, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and 
Wyoming (the "Intermountain Region"). The Company was formed to continue and expand the 
business, commenced in 1957, of certain affiliated companies (the "Predecessor Companies") owned 
and controlled by John Price, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company. The 
Company is the largest owner/operator of retail properties in the states of Utah, Idaho and Wyoming, 
and is one of the largest owner/operators of retail properties in the Intermountain Region, based, in 
each case, on Total GLA owned and managed. Since 1976, the Predecessor Companies have been 
responsible for developing more malls in the Intermountain Region than any other developer, having 
constructed, developed or redeveloped 13 malls (including 11 in the Intermountain Region). Based on 
published independent economic studies, the Intermountain Region is expected to outpace the nation as 
a whole in certain population and economic growth rates for the balance of the 1990's. 
The Company's existing real properties (the "Properties") consist of 32 retail properties, including 
four regional malls, four mini-malls, 21 community centers and three free-standing retail properties, 
located in ten states and six commercial properties located primarily in the Salt Lake City, Utah area. 
All of the Properties were developed or redeveloped by the Predecessor Companies. The Properties are 
currently owned by privately organized partnerships, joint ventures and a corporation and are controlled 
by the Predecessor Companies. Following the Offering, the Properties or interests therein will be owned 
by the Company through its interest in Price Development Company, Limited Partnership ("PDC"). 
The existing partners and stockholders of the current Property owners (the "Original Partners") will 
continue to own a combined 25.6% interest in the Properties primarily through limited partnership 
interests (the "PDC Units") in PDC. These Original Partners include certain officers and directors of 
the Company, members of their immediate families, entities owned by them and Price family trusts 
(together, the "Price Principals") who will, following the Offering, own a combined 20.8% interest in 
PDC. 
The Company's retail portfolio contains an aggregate of approximately 6,600,000 square feet of 
Total GLA. The Company's commercial portfolio, containing over 1,113,000 square feet of GLA, is 
primarily located in the Salt Lake City, Utah area. For the nine months ended September 30, 1993, the 
retail properties and the commercial properties contributed approximately 88% and 12%, respectively, 
to the Company's net operating income {i.e., revenues less property operating expenses, before interest 
expenses and depreciation). 
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The Company's strategy is to (i) achieve cash flow growth and to enhance the value of its existing 
Properties by increasing their rental and net operating income over time and (ii) achieve additional cash 
flow growth and to enhance the value of its real property portfolio over time through selective 
acquisitions of additional retail properties in underserved and/or growing markets and, to a lesser 
extent, through the development, in such markets, of new retail properties. The Company expects to 
concentrate its acquisition and other development activities in the Intermountain Region. 
The Company's seven principal executive officers together have an average of 19 years of 
experience in the ownership, leasing, management, operation, development, redevelopment and acquisi-
tion of malls, community centers and other commercial properties. Six of these officers have worked 
together at the Predecessor Companies for over 16 years. The Company has approximately 240 
employees, including a corporate staff of over 45 individuals supporting senior management and 
approximately 190 property management personnel. See "Management." 
The Company expects to qualify as a real estate investment trust (a "REIT") for federal income 
tax purposes and will be self-administered and self-managed and will not employ a third party property 
manager. Concurrently with the closing of the Offering, the Company will retire substantially all of the 
existing mortgage debt encumbering the Properties and will incur $95 million in fixed rate mortgage 
debt (the "Mortgage Debt") and S9.0 million in mortgage debt from Chemical Bank (the "Chemical 
Loan"). See "The Mortgage Loans—The Mortgage Debt" and "—Other Mortgages." The Company's 
executive offices are located at 35 Century Park-Way, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, and its telephone 
number is (801) 486-3911. The Company is a Maryland corporation incorporated on September 8 
1993. 
Risk Factors 
Prospective investors should carefully consider the matters discussed under "Risk Factors" prior to 
making an investment decision regarding the Common Stock offered hereby. Some of the significant 
considerations include: 
• There is no assurance that the value of the equity interests to be received by the Original 
Partners and the Price Principals and the cash payments to be received by two other Original 
Partners (neither of which is a Price Principal), who will not be receiving such equity interests, will 
not exceed the net value of the Properties and certain other assets being contributed by such 
Original Partners since the method of valuing the Properties and other assets was not based on 
independent appraisals or arm's length negotiations between the Original Partners and the 
Company. 
• There are risks associated with mortgage indebtedness, including that required payments on I 
debt obligations will not be reduced if the economic performance of any asset declines and that the 
Company will need to refinance the Mortgage Debt which is expected to mature in 2001 and other 
borrowings which will be incurred or assumed by PDC at the closing of the Offering. 
• Immediate and substantial dilution of S8.10 per share in the net book value of the Common 
Stock will be experienced by purchasers in the Offering. 
• The Original Partners, including the Price Principals, due to their investment in the entities 
that previously owned the Properties, may experience different, and more adverse, tax conse-
quences than other stockholders of the Company upon the sale of any of such Properties by the 
Company or the refinancing or repayment of debt obligations; consequently, the Price Principals 
may have an incentive to influence the Company not to sell a Property or to repay or refinance 
indebtedness even though such sale, repayment or refinancing might otherwise be financially 
advantageous to the Company. Other possible conflicts of interest may arise in connection with the 
enforcement of the terms of agreements relating to the contribution of the Properties to the 
Company. 
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• The use of a substantial portion of the proceeds of the Offering to repay existing mortgage 
I debt currently encumbering the Properties. 
I • The Price Principals, which include certain officers and directors of the Company, will 
I control the affairs of the Company, which could result in decisions that do not reflect the interests 
J of all stockholders of the Company. 
I • The Company may face potential liabilities for environmental conditions. The cost of such 
J potential liabilities, if borne by the Company, could adversely affect the Company's income and 
I cash flow and the value of its assets. 
J • The Company will face risks relating to the ownership of real estate, including those relating 
I to changes in economic climate, local conditions, laws and regulations, the relative illiquidity of 
I real property investments, the potential bankruptcy of tenants and the development, redevelopment 
J or expansion of properties. 
I • The voting rights of the Price Group Stock, which will be held by an entity owned by John 
J Price, the provisions contained in the Company's Articles of Incorporation limiting ownership, with 
I certain exceptions, to 5% of the number or value of the outstanding capital stock of the Company 
J and other provisions of the Maryland General Corporation Law (the "MGCL") could deter the 
I acquisition of control of the Company by a third party without the consent of the Company's Board 
I of Directors. 
I • No contractual limitation exists on the amount of indebtedness which the Company may 
J incur. As a result, the Company could become highly leveraged. 
I • The Board of Directors has the ability to amend or revise the investment and financing 
f policies of the Company without a vote of the stockholders. 
I • Taxation of the Company as a corporation if it fails to qualify as a REIT could adversely 
I affect the ability of the Company to make expected distributions to stockholders. 
I The Properties 
I The Properties consist of four regional malls in three states, four mini-malls in three states, 21 
I community centers in seven states, three free-standing retail properties in Utah and Idaho and six 
I commercial properties primarily in the Salt Lake City, Utah area. 
The Company's mall portfolio includes Boise Towne Square, Boise, Idaho, and Cottonwood Mall, 
I Salt Lake City, Utah, as well as other malls located in Logan, Utah; Clovis, New Mexico; Pocatello, 
Idaho; St. George, Utah; Kelso, Washington; and Rock Springs, Wyoming. Each of the regional malls 
I and mini-malls is the premier and dominant, and in some cases the only, mall within its trade area, 
I generally considered to be the financial, economic and social center for a given geographic area. The 
trade areas surrounding the Company's malls have a drawing radius, depending on the mall, ranging 
from five to over 150 miles. The four regional malls in the portfolio contain an aggregate of approxi-
I mately 2,668,000 square feet of Total GLA and range in size from approximately 400,000 to 875,000 
t ittjftrare fetftof Total GLA. The four smaller mini-malls aggregate approximately 1,192,000 square feet 
f of Total GLA and range in size from approximately 250,000 to 350,000 square feet of Total GLA. Over 
the three-year period ended December 31, 1992, annual sales of mail shops (i.e., nonanchor stores) per 
square foot across the Company's regional mall and mini-mall portfolios grew from an average of 
approximately SI51 to S211 and SI09 to SI46, respectively, which represented an annual compounded 
increase of approximately 11.8% and 10.3%, respectively. The malls have attracted some of the leading 
national and regional retail companies as anchor tenants, such as JC Penney, ZCMI, Wal-Mart, The 
Bon Marche, Sears and Mervyn's. The community center and free-standing retail portfolio contains 
over 2,747,000 square feet GLA. The Company's community center and free-standing retail portfolio 
includes properties located in seven states with the greatest concentration in Utah and Idaho, as well as 
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others located in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada and Oregon. Leading anchor tenants in the 
community centers include Shopko. Fred Meyer, Albertsons, Burlington Coat, Best Products, Safeway, 
Ernst Home Centers and PayLess Drug. 
Set forth below is certain information regarding the location, size and occupancy rate of the 
Properties: 
% of Occupancy Rate 
Number of Total Total as of 
State Properties GLA GLA 9/30/93(1) 
Utah 19 3,660,000 47% 97% 
Idaho 8 1,980,000 26 97 
Washington 1 502,000 7 94 
Oregon 3 356,000 5 96 
Wyoming 1 341,000 4 75(2) 
New Mexico 1 288,000 4 96 
Nevada 2 270,000 3 100 
Colorado 1 122,000 2 99 
Arizona 1 119,000 1 97 
California _ | 77,000 1 100 
Total 38 7,715,000 100% 96% to 
(1) Occupancy rate is based on the percentage of Total GLA occupied. 
(2) The occupancy rate reflects an anchor store which was vacated in connection with a previous 
expansion of White Mountain Mall in order to accommodate a new anchor tenant. 
Property Expansions and Development 
The Company plans to expand and renovate White Mountain Mall, Cottonwood Mall and Boise 
Towne Square and to construct a new Ernst Home Center adjacent to Red Cliffs Mall. Once completed, 
the Company estimates that these additions will contain an aggregate of approximately 383,000 
additional square feet of Total GLA (including an estimated 277,000 square feet that will be Company-
owned). The Company expects to commence the projects for Red Cliffs Mall, White Mountain Mall 
and Cottonwood Mall in 1994 and expects completion in 1994, 1995 and 1996, respectively. The 
expansion and renovation of Boise Towne Square is expected to commence in 1995 and to be completed 
in 1997. In addition, the Company is developing the Spokane Valley Mall in Spokane, Washington. 
Construction for this mall is expected to commence in 1994, with completion of the first phase, which 
will contain approximately 650,000 square feet of Total GLA, anticipated to occur during 1995 or 1996. 
JCP Realty, Inc., an affiliate of JC Penney Co., Inc., has a 25% equity interest in this project. Anchors 
that have committed in principle to long-term leases or property acquisitions in this mall are JC Penney, 
The Bon Marche, Mervyn's and Lamonts. 
Included as part of the Company's retail properties are approximately 30.6 acres of vacant land 
suitable for additional development and expansion projects. These properties also contain additional 
improved land ready for development of approximately 250,000 square feet of anchor, mall shop and 
free-standing retail space. 
Substantial Geographic Presence in the Intermountain Region 
The Company's activities are conducted primarily in the Intermountain Region of the United 
States. The Company is the largest owner/operator of retail properties in the states of Utah, Idaho and 
Wyoming and is one of the largest in the Intermountain Region based, in each case, on Total GLA 
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• acquire strategically located, quality retail properties primarily in the Intermountain Region 
! that (i) have leases at rental rates below market rates, (ii) have potential for rental and/or 
occupancy increases, (iii) offer cash flow growth or capital appreciation potential where the 
Company's financial strength, relationships with retail companies or expansion or redevelopment 
capabilities can enhance a property's value and/or (iv) provide anticipated total returns that will 
increase the Company's dividends per share of Common Stock. 
Expansions and Development 
• implement the expansion and renovation of Boise Towne Square, White Mountain Mall and 
Cottonwood Mall and construct a new Ernst Home Center adjacent to Red Cliffs Mall; 
• complete the construction and development of the Spokane Valley Mall; 
• strategically redevelop and expand other properties to meet the needs of existing or new 
tenants; 
• develop, in close cooperation with anchor tenants, other new retail properties in underserved 
and/or growing markets primarily in the Intermountain Region; and 
• continue to control financial exposure by conditioning property acquisitions for development 
projects on prior satisfaction of zoning and related requirements and on receipt of financing and 
significant leasing commitments. 
The Company believes that it is well positioned to respond to several significant changes that have 
occurred in the retail real estate industry. As a fully integrated real estate business, the Company will 
conduct all property management, leasing, marketing, finance, accounting, property acquisition, reno-
vation, expansion and development activities. Further, its strong financial position and liquidity should 
enable it to make opportunistic acquisitions, particularly in light of the substantial reduction in the 
availability of traditional types of real estate financing. In addition, the Company believes that its 
experience in the retail real estate industry, along with its large real property portfolio and its retail 
company relationships, will enable it to continue the successful operation of the Properties and to 
compete successfully for tenants, in light of the greater emphasis now placed by tenants on the economic 
strength and experience of their landlords. 
Formation of the Company 
The Company has been formed to continue and expand the business of the Predecessor Companies. 
Upon completion of the Offering, the Company will, through PDC, become the owner of the 38 
Properties or interests thereof and certain other assets of the Predecessor Companies consisting of a 75% 
interest in the Spokane Valley Mall development project, a 30% limited partnership interest in the 
Silver Lake Mall in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho (containing approximately 400,000 square feet of Total 
GLA), an 8.3% combined general and limited partnership interest in East Ridge Mall in Casper, 
Wyoming (containing approximately 570,000 square feet of Total GLA), furniture, fixtures and 
equipment held by the Predecessor Companies and property management agreements relating to four 
real properties, including East Ridge Mall (such other assets being referred to as the "Contributed 
Assets"). The Properties are currently owned by privately organized partnerships, joint ventures and a 
corporation owned by the Original Partners, including the Price Principals. In order to facilitate the 
organization of the Company's business, the following transactions have been or will be effected: 
• The Company was formed as a Maryland corporation on September 8, 1993. 
• The existing owners of the Properties will contribute such Properties or interests therein and 
the Contributed Assets to PDC and will convert debt in the amount of $1,844,000 to be assumed by 
PDC in connection with the formation of the Company in exchange for 3,692,309 PDC Units. At 
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any time after one year from the date of this Prospectus, the PDC Units will be exchangeable, at 
the option of the holders thereof, for shares of Common Stock, on a one-for-one basis (subject to 
adjustment in the event of stock splits, dividends, combinations or reclassifications). The Company 
has the right, however, if the PDC Units are presented for exchange, to deliver to the holder of such 
PDC Units, in lieu of shares of Common Stock, cash in an amount equal to the market value of 
such shares. 
• An entity owned by John Price will convert S3.5 million in debt to be assumed by PDC in 
connection with the formation of the Company into 200,000 shares of Price Group Stock. 
• The Company will sell 11,330,000 shares of Common Stock to purchasers in the Offering. 
Assuming exchange of all PDC Units for, and conversion of all shares of Price Group Stock to, 
Common Stock, such purchasers would own approximately 74.4% of the outstanding Common 
Stock and the Company would own 100% of PDC. 
• The Company, as the sole general partner of PDC, will contribute the net proceeds of the 
Offering in exchange for an approximate 75.7% interest in PDC. 
• Concurrently with the closing of the Offering, a financing subsidiary of PDC will incur the 
Mortgage Debt (which will be secured by first mortgage liens on the eight malls) in the 
approximate principal amount of S95 million and PDC will incur the Chemical Loan in the 
approximate principal amount of S9.0 million. 
• The Company will utilize the net proceeds from the Offering, the Mortgage Debt and the 
Chemical Loan to (i) retire existing mortgage debt on the Properties and other borrowings relating 
to the Properties, having a principal amount, including accrued and unpaid interest as of Septem-
ber 30, 1993, of approximately S213.7 million (which debt represents substantially all existing 
indebtedness of the Predecessor Companies secured by or relating to the Properties) and pay 
prepayment penalties resulting from such retirement of approximated S5.5 million, (ii) purchase 
the equity interests held by two Original Partners, neither of which is a Price Principal in 
Cottonwood Mall for approximately S45.1 million, (iii) retire existing indebtedness encumbering 
the Spokane Valley Mall development parcel, having a principal amount, including accrued and 
unpaid interest, as of September 30, 1993, of approximately S8 million, and to invest an additional 
S4 million in the Spokane Valley Mall development project, and (iv) provide approximately S3 
million for working capital. 
• Prior to the Offering, John Price acquired 1,000 shares of Common Stock at S17.50 per 
share. 
• Prior to the Offering, certain of the partners in the partnership that owns Gateway Crossing 
exchanged their interests in this partnership for two stand-alone retail stores and an adjacent 
vacant pad located at this Property having a book value as of September 30, 1993 of approximately 
$226,000. Such retail stores and vacant pad will therefore not be transferred to PDC upon closing 
of the Offering. 
• Assuming all PDC Units are exchanged for, and all shares of Price Group Stock are 
converted to. Common Stock, the Original Partners will hold, either directly or indirectly through 
the existing owners, approximately 25.6% of the outstanding Common Stock of the Company. 
Benefits to Original Partners Relating to the Formation of the Company 
The Original Partners will contribute to PDC the Properties and the Contributed Assets, which in 
the aggregate had a book value deficit of S6.5 million as of September 30, 1993. In return, the Original 
Partners or entities owned by them will receive PDC Units having a value of approximately S64.6 
million (based upon the initial public offering price of the Common Stock in the Offering) and two other 
Original Partners (neither of which is a Price Principal), which own a combined 75% equity interest in 
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the Cottonwood Mall, will receive $45.1 million in cash. The book value deficit in the Price Principals' 
interest in the Properties and such Contributed Assets amounted to approximately $30.5 million. The 
I Price Principals will receive PDC Units having a value of approximately $51.8 million (based on such 
initial public offering price). Other benefits to the Original Partners include: 
• partial deferral of income tax consequences arising out of the contribution by the Original 
Partners of the Properties to PDC; 
• repayment of certain existing mortgage debt encumbering the Properties and other borrow-
ings by the Predecessor Companies, which debt had a principal amount, including accrued and 
unpaid interest, as of September 30, 1993, of approximately $221.7 million; 
• release of the Original Partners from personal guarantees which currently cover a portion of 
the existing indebtedness having a principal amount, including accrued and unpaid interest, as of 
September 30, 1993, of approximately $94.4 million; 
• receipt by an entity controlled by John Price of 200,000 shares of Price Group Stock 
entitling him, subject to certain restrictions, to elect two of the seven members of the Board of 
Directors; 
• anticipated receipt, at the closing of the Offering, by John Price and other executive officers 
of the Company of stock options to purchase an aggregate of 475,000 shares of Common Stock at 
the initial public offering price; 
• improved liquidity of Original Partners' interests in the Properties; and 
• increased diversification of Original Partners' investments. 
Additional information regarding the benefits to the Original Partners is set forth under "The 
Company—Formation of the Company," "Use of Proceeds," "Management—1993 Stock Option Plan" 
and "Certain Transactions." 
Restriction on Other John Price Real Estate Activities 
John Price has agreed with the Company that, for the period that he remains Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Company, he will conduct his future real estate business activities through the 
Company. His agreement contains limited exceptions pertaining to retained interests in five improved 
properties not deemed suitable for the Company and two unimproved tracts near several of the 
Company's Properties and on which the Company will hold purchase options. See "The Company— 
Restriction on Other John Price Real Estate Activities." 
The Operating Partnership and Financing Subsidiary 
All operations of the Company will be conducted through PDC and a financing subsidiary thereof. 
The ownership, management and capital structure of the Company are intended to (i) benefit the 
Original Partners by allowing them to defer the tax consequences of the contribution of the Properties to 
PDC, (ii) enable the Company to comply with certain technical and complex requirements under the 
federal income tax rules and regulations relating to the assets and income permitted to a REIT, 
(iii) enhance the ability of the Company to obtain capital, and (iv) reduce the financial leverage and 
debt service on the Properties through the repayment of indebtedness out of the net proceeds of the 
Offering and the Mortgage Debt. See "The Company—Formation of the Company" and "—Price 
Development Company," "Risk Factors" and "Federal Income Tax Considerations." The Company 
intends, subject to the tax, structural and other risks discussed under "Risk Factors," that (i) the 
Company will control the management of all the Properties, and (ii) stockholders in the Company will 
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achieve substantially the same economic benefits as if the Company had direct ownership, operation and 
management of the Properties. 
The Mortgage Loans 
The Mortgage Debt 
Concurrently with the closing of the Offering, the Company will retire substantially all of the 
existing mortgage debt encumbering the Properties and will incur $95 million in fixed rate mortgage 
debt (the "Mortgage Debt"). The Mortgage Debt will be structured as a securitized financing funded 
through the issuance of mortgage-backed securities ("Secured Notes") by or on behalf of a financing 
subsidiary of PDC. The Mortgage Debt will have an initial term of seven years, have an interest rate 
estimated to be 6.42% per annum, provide for the payment of interest only for the initial term of the 
loan, be collateralized by the Company's eight mails and contain customary representations, warranties 
and covenants, including those restricting additional borrowings secured by a second mortgage on any 
of the collateralized properties. See "The Mortgage Loans—The Mortgage Debt." 
Other Mortgages 
Concurrently with the closing of the Offering, the Company also will incur the S9.0 million 
Chemical Loan which will bear interest at a floating rate subject to an interest rate cap to produce a 
maximum all-in fixed rate of 6.5% per annum. The Chemical Loan will be secured by first mortgaee 
liens on Gateway Crossing and three buildings, containing an aggregate of approximately 255 000 
square feet of GLA, in Price Business Center-Pioneer Square. The Chemical Loan, which will be for a 
term of two years, is expected to be recourse to PDC and to be guaranteed by an entity owned bv John 
Price. 
In addition, the Company will own a vacant parcel of land located next to Boise Towne Square 
which is subject to an existing S1.4 million mortgage held by Chemical Bank (the "Land Mortgage").' 
The Land Mortgage requires payment of interest only at a floating rate equal to the 30-day LIBOR plus 
2.5% per annum and matures in 1994. It is expected that this parcel will be used in the planned 
expansion of Boise Towne Square. See "Business and Properties—Strategy—Expansions and 
Redevelopment." 
The Company will also own Sears-Eastgate subject to an existing mortgage held by Sun Life 
Assurance Company of Canada. As of September 30, 1993, the outstanding principal balance of the 
loan, plus accrued and unpaid interest, amounted to approximately S2.5 million. The loan bears interest 
at the rate of 9.375% per annum and requires monthly payments of principal and interest of $27,842 
each until November 1, 1999. and $14,971 each from December 1, 1999 until November 1. 2001. The 
entire unpaid principal balance of the loan, plus accrued and unpaid interest, is due on November 30 
2001. 
Proposed Line of Credit 
The Company is currently negotiating the terms of a multi-year revolving credit facility which is 
expected to be obtained in an amount of approximately $50 million. The credit facility will be used for 
working capital and to fund property acquisitions, expansion, development and redevelopment activities. 
See "Risk Factors—Consequences of Debt Financing" and "Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations." 
Proposed Spokane Loan 
The Company is also currently negotiating a construction facility for use, following the completion 
of the Offering, to fund the balance of the construction and development of the first phase of the 
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inability to obtain the revolving credit line would impair the Company's ability to acquire additional 
properties or to commence its proposed expansion projects and a delay or inability to obtain the 
construction facility would delay commencement of the construction of the Spokane Valley Mall 
development project. 
Dilution Experienced by Purchasers in the Offering 
The purchasers of the Common Stock offered by this Prospectus will experience immediate dilution 
of $8.10 per share in the net book value of the Common Stock. See "Dilution." 
Conflicts of Interest 
Prior to the exchange of PDC Units for Common Stock, the Original Partners will suffer different 
and more adverse tax consequences than other stockholders of the Company upon the sale of any of the 
Properties or the repayment or refinancing of indebtedness. Therefore, the Original Partners and the 
Company, as partners in PDC, may have different objectives regarding the appropriate pricing and 
timing of any sale of the Properties or the repayment or refinancing of indebtedness. Consequently, 
certain of the Original Partners, such as the Price Principals, may have an incentive to influence the 
Company not to sell a Property or to repay or refinance indebtedness, even though such sale, repayment 
or refinancing might otherwise be financially advantageous to the Company. See "Federal Income Tax 
Considerations—Tax Aspects of the Company's Investment in PDC—Tax Allocations with Respect to 
the Properties." In addition, the Original Partners are expected to provide guarantees of collection of 
the Mortgage Debt, although the Properties securing such debt will he subject to claims with respect to 
such debt prior to any call on such collection guarantees. An entity owned by John Price is expected to 
provide a payment guaranty for the Chemical Loan. As a result of such guarantees, conflicts may exist 
with regard to allocations of available cash of PDC with respect to the Mortgage Debt and the 
Chemical Loan. See "The Mortgage Loans—The Mortgage Debt" and "—Other Mortgages." 
The Price Principals control PDC and the existing owners of the Properties. Consequently, the 
Price Principals will have a conflict of interest with respect to their obligation as officers and directors of 
the Company to enforce the terms of the agreements relating to the contribution of the Properties to 
PDC. The failure to enforce the material terms of these agreements, particularly the indemnification 
provisions and the remedy provisions for breaches of representations and warranties, could result in a 
monetary loss to the Company. 
Following the Offering, the Company will have property management agreements relating to an 
apartment complex which is owned by a partnership in which John Price serves as general partner and 
an office building which is owned by a partnership in which John Price is a limited partner. See 
"Business and Properties—Strategy—Third Party Property Management." John Price will have a 
conflict of interest with respect to his obligation as an officer and director of the Company to enforce the 
terms of these agreements. 
Three fast food companies, which operate eleven "food court" restaurants within the malls owned 
by the Company, are owned by John Price and Mr. and Mrs. Steven Price (Steven Price is the son of 
John Price). These restaurants lease space from the Company. The leases encompass 6,011 square feet 
of GLA and provide a combined annual rental of SI55,544. Certain of the leases contain base rental 
escalation clauses. The leases expire over a period ranging from 1996 through 2003. 
Control by Price Principals 
None of the directors or officers of the Company or the Price Principals is selling any Common 
Stock (or PDC Units) in the Offering. Upon completion of the Offering, the Price Principals will own in 
the aggregate approximately 20.8% of the outstanding Common Stock (assuming exchange of all PDC 
Units for, and conversion of all shares of Price Group Stock to, Common Stock). The 200,000 shares of 
Price Group Stock owned by an entity controlled by John Price will entitle him initially to elect two of 
15 
Formation of the Company 
The Company was organized by John Price and the other Price Principals. Upon completion of the 
Offering, the Company will, through PDC. own the 38 Properties or interests therein and the 
Contributed Assets. The Properties are currently owned by privately organized partnerships joint 
ventures and a corporation owned by the Original Partners, including the Price Principals. In order to 
facilitate the organization of the Company, the following transactions have been or will be effected: 
• The Company was formed as a Maryland corporation on September 8, 1993. 
• The existing owners of the 38 Properties will contribute such Properties or interests therein 
and the Contributed Assets to PDC and will convert debt in the amount of SI,844 000 to be 
f<oT™obDyr^DT? ^ ^ o n n e c t i o n w[th t h e formation of the Company in exchange for 
3.692.309 PDC Units. At any time after one year from the date of this Prospectus the PDC 
Units will be exchangeable, at the option of the holders thereof, for shares of'Common 
Stock, on a one-for-one basis (subject to adjustment in the event of stock splits dividends 
combinations or reclassifications). The Company has the right, however, if the PDC Units' 
are presented for exchange, to deliver to the holder of such PDC Units, in lieu of shares of 
Common Stock, cash m an amount equal to the market value of such shares. 
• An entity owned by John Price will convert S3.5 million in debt to be assumed by PDC in 
connection with the formation of the Company into 200.000 shares of Price Group Stock. 
• The Company will sell 11.330,000 shares of Common Stock to purchasers in the Offering 
Assuming exchange of all PDC Units for. and conversion of all shares of Price Group Stock 
to. Common Stock, such purchasers would own approximately 74.4% of the outstanding 
Common Stock and the Company would own 100% of PDC. 
• The Company, as sole general partner of PDC, will contribute the net proceeds of the 
Offering to PDC m exchange for an approximate 75.7% interest in PDC. All properties 
acquired by the Company after the closing of the Offering will be held by or through PDC. 
• Concurrently with the closing of the Offering, a financing subsidiary of PDC will incur the 
Mortgage Debt (which will be secured by first mortgage liens on the eight malls) in the 
approximate principal amount of $95 million and PDC will incur the Chemical Loan in the 
approximate principal amount of S9.0 million. 
• The Company will utilize the net proceeds from the Offering, the Mortgage Debt and the 
Chemical Loan to (i) retire existing mortgage debt on the Properties and other borrowings 
relating to the Properties, having a principal amount, including accrued and unpaid interest 
as of September 30. 1993. of approximately S213.7 million (which debt represents substan-
tially all existing indebtedness of the Predecessor Companies secured by or relating to the 
Properties) and pay prepayment penalties relating to such retirement of approximately 
S5.5 million, (li) purchase the equity interests held by two Original Partners neither of 
which is a Price Principal, in Cottonwood Mall for approximately $45.1 million (iii) retire 
existing indebtedness encumbering the Spokane Valley Mall development parcel, having a 
principal amount, including accrued and unpaid interest, as of September 30,' 1993 of 
approximately S8 million, and to invest an additional 54 million in the Spokane Valley Mall 
development project, and (iv) provide approximately $3 million for working capital. 
• Prior to the Offering, John Price acquired 1,000 shares of Common Stock at $17.50 per 
share. 
• Prior to the Offering, certain of the partners in the partnership that owns Gateway Crossing 
exchanged their interests in this partnership for two stand-alone retail stores and an adjacent 
vacant pad located at this Property having a book value as of September 30, 1993 of 
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approximately S226.000. Such retail stores and vacant pad will therefore not be transferred 
to PDC upon closing of the Offering. 
• Assuming all PDC Units are exchanged for, and all shares of Price Group Stock are 
converted to, Common Stock, the Original Partners will hold, either directly or indirectly 
through the existing owners, approximately 25.6% of the outstanding Common Stock. 
The ownership interest received by the Original Partners in PDC was not based on arm's length 
negotiations between the Original Partners and the Company or on independent appraisals of the 
Properties and the Contributed Assets. Instead, such ownership interest was determined based upon an 
assessment of the enterprise value of the Company as a going concern following the Offering (which will 
be based on the factors referred to under "Underwriting") and an assessment of the total amount of 
equity capital that will be required by the Company to retire substantially all existing mortgage 
indebtedness currently encumbering the Properties and the mortgage indebtedness currently encumber-
ing the Spokane Valley Mall development parcel, purchase the equity interests of two Original Partners 
and meet other business objectives of the Company described herein. These determinations are expected 
to result in allocations to the purchasers of Common Stock in the Offering and to the Original Partners 
of equity interests in the Company and PDC as set forth above. 
Benefits to Original Partners Relating to the Formation Transactions 
The Original Partners will contribute to PDC the Properties and the Contributed Assets, which in 
the aggregate had a book value deficit of S6.5 million as of September 30, 1993. In return, the Original 
Partners or entities owned by them will receive PDC Units having a value of approximately S64.6 
million (based upon the initial public offering price per share of the Common Stock in the Offering) and 
two other Original Partners (neither of which is a Price Principal), which own a combined 75% equity 
interest in Cottonwood Mall, will receive S45.1 million in cash. The book value deficit in the Price 
Principals' interest in the Properties and such Contributed Assets amounted to approximately S30.5 
million. The Price Principals will receive PDC Units having a value of approximately S51.8 million 
(based on such initial public offering price). Other benefits to the Original Partners include: 
• The Original Partners will experience a partial deferral of the income tax consequences of 
the contribution of the Properties to PDC. 
• Existing indebtedness encumbering the Properties and other borrowings by the Predecessor 
Companies will be repaid. Such debt had, as of September 30, 1993, a principal amount, 
including accrued and unpaid interest, of approximately S221.7 million. 
• The Original Partners will be relieved of personal guarantees which currently cover a 
portion of the existing indebtedness having a principal amount, including accrued and 
unpaid interest, as of September 30, 1993, of approximately S94.4 million. 
• An entity owned by John Price will receive 200.000 shares of Price Group Stock entitling 
him, subject to certain restrictions, to elect two of the seven members of the Board of 
Directors. 
• The Original Partners will receive PDC Units, which are exchangeable for Common Stock 
and, therefore, wall improve the liquidity of their investments. 
• John Price and other executive officers of the Company are expected to be granted, at the 
closing of the Offering, stock options to purchase an aggregate of 475,000 shares of Common 
Stock at the initial public offering price. 
• The Original Partners will increase the diversification of their investments to a portfolio that 
includes all the Properties. 
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apartment complex will be managed by the Company for a fee pursuant to property management 
agreements. See "Business and Properties—Strategy—Third Party Property Management." John Price 
intends to attempt to dispose of the retained properties, but will continue to hold interests in the retained 
properties until suitable buyers can be arranged. John Price also will retain a 34-acre tract near Price 
Business Center-Pioneer Square, and a 52-acre tract near Technology Park, neither of which will be 
acquired by the Company upon completion of the Offering, and will grant purchase options to PDC. 
The options will be for a term of ten years and provide for a purchase price for each property equal to 
the lesser of fair market value or 110% of acquisition cost to its current owner plus actual cost of carry 
of such property (which includes interest, taxes and insurance) from the date of its acquisition by such 
owner through the date of its purchase by PDC. The decision to exercise or refrain from exercising the 
options will be made by a majority of the disinterested directors. John Price's agreement with the 
Company permits him to participate in the development and subsequent ownership and management of 
the properties in the event that PDC does not exercise such purchase options. 
USE OF PROCEEDS 
The net proceeds of the Offering, after payment of offering and organizational expenses, are 
estimated to be $179.2 million ($206.9 million if the Underwriters' over-allotment options are exercised 
in full). The Company plans to use the net proceeds of the Offering to purchase its general partner 
interest in PDC. PDC will in turn utilize such proceeds, together with the net proceeds from the 
Mortgage Debt and the Chemical Loan, estimated to total $100.0 million, as follows: (i) retire existing 
mortgage debt on the Properties and other borrowings relating to the Properties, having a principal 
amount, including accrued and unpaid interest as of September 30, 1993, of approximately S213.7 
million (which debt represents substantially all existing indebtedness of the Predecessor Companies 
secured by or relating to the Properties) and pay prepayment penalties relating to such retirement of 
approximately $5.5 million; (ii) purchase the equity interests held by two Original Partners, neither of 
which is a Price Principal, in Cottonwood Mall for approximately $45.1 million; (iii) retire existing 
indebtedness encumbering Spokane Valley Mall development parcel, having a principal amount, 
including accrued and unpaid interest, as of September 30, 1993, of approximately $8 million, and to 
invest an additional $4 million in the Spokane Valley Mall development project; and (iv) provide 
approximately $3 million for working capital. As of September 30, 1993, the weighted average interest 
rate on the indebtedness that will be retired with the proceeds of the Offering and the weighted average 
maturity of such indebtedness was approximately 7.75% and three years, respectively. Out of the 
indebtedness to be retired in connection with the formation of the Company, including out of the net 
proceeds of the Offering, the Mortgage Debt and the Chemical Loan, approximately $27.1 million 
represents amounts due to Fairfax Realty, Inc. ("Fairfax", known currently as Price Development 
Company), which is the company through which the principal operations of the Predecessor Companies 
are currently conducted. Fairfax borrowed funds from third party lenders in order to provide loans to 
certain of the Predecessor Companies during the development and lease-up periods of certain Proper-
ties. As of September 30, 1993, the principal plus accrued and unpaid interest outstanding under the 
loans taken by Fairfax for this purpose from the third party lenders amounted to $21.7 million. Upon 
closing of the Offering, PDC will repay (out of Offering proceeds) that amount of principal plus accrued 
and unpaid interest that Fairfax owes to third party lenders as of such closing. At the closing of the 
Offering, PDC will also assume an additional $5.4 million of indebtedness owed to Fairfax. Such debt, 
which will not be repaid out of Offering or debt proceeds, will be contributed by Fairfax to (i) the 




The following table sets forth the beneficial ownership of shares of Common Stock for (1) each 
person who is expected to be a stockholder of the Company holding more than a 5% interest in the 
Company and (2) the directors and executive officers of the Company as a group. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all of such interests are owned directly, and the indicated person or entity has sole voting and 
investment power. The number of shares of Common Stock represents the number of shares the person 
is expected to hold in addition to the number of shares of Common Stock into which PDC Units or 
shares of Price Group Stock expected to be held by the person are exchangeable. 
Percent Percent 
Name and Address Common Stock of All of All 
of Beneficial Owner Beneficially Owned Shares(2) Units(3) 
John Price(l) 2.947.184(4) 19.4%(4) 75.796(4) 
Fairfax(l) 1,295.392 8.5 33.3 
Directors and executive officers as a group 
(eight persons) 3,163.789(4) 20.8(4) 81.3(4) 
(1) The mailing address of such beneficial owner is 35 Century Park-Way. Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
(2) Assumes that all shares of Price Group Stock and PDC Units held by the person are exchanged for 
shares of Common Stock and assumes that none of the PDC Units held by other persons are 
exchanged for shares of Common Stock. 
(3) Assumes no PDC Units are exchanged for shares of Common Stock. 
(4) Includes 200,000 shares of Price Group Stock expected to be beneficially owned by John Price (see 
"The Company—Formation of the Company") and 1,295.392 PDC Units expected to be owned of 
record by Fairfax, all of the outstanding capital stock of which is owned by John Price. Also 
includes 431,569 PDC Units expected to be owned of record by JPET II Company, Ltd., a limited 
partnership in which John Price is the sole general partner and Price family trusts are the sole 
limited partners. John Price disclaims beneficial ownership of the PDC Units to be held by such 
partnership, except to the extent of his approximate 6.1% partnership interest therein. 
DESCRIPTION OF SECURITIES 
The following summary of the terms of the capital stock of the Company set forth below does not 
purport to be complete and is subject to and qualified in its entirety by reference to the Articles of 
Incorporation and bylaws of the Company, copies of which are exhibits to the Registration Statement of 
which this Prospectus is a part. See "Additional Information." 
General 
The Company's Articles of Incorporation provide that the Company may issue up to 200,000,000 
shares of capital stock, all with a par value of $.0001 per share. Initially, 124,800,000 of such shares will 
be designated as Common Stock, 200,000 of such shares will be designated as Price Group Stock and 
75,000,000 of such shares will be designated as Excess Stock. Upon completion of the Offering and the 
related transactions, 15,223,309 shares of Common Stock will be issued and outstanding (or subject to 
issuance upon exchange of PDC Units or conversion of outstanding shares of Price Group Stock), and 
200,000 shares of Price Group Stock and no shares of Preferred Stock will be issued and outstanding. 
The Board of Directors is authorized to reclassify any unissued portion of the authorized shares of 
capital stock to provide for the issuance of shares in other classes or series, including preferred stock in 
one or more series, to establish the number of shares in each class or series and to fix the preferences, 
conversion and other rights, voting powers, restrictions, limitations as to dividends, qualifications and 
terms and conditions of redemption of such class or series. 
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"p. Price's $6,160 Letter of 3/8/94 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
35 CENTURY PARK-WAY • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
/--
,a 
TELEPHONE (801) 4*6-3911 
TELECOPIER'FAX (801) 486-7653 
March 8, 1994 Via Facsimile 
Original by Regular Mail 
Amiand L. Smith 
P.O. Box 159 
Clovis, New Mexico 88101 
POSITION 
EXHIBIT ) A : 
Re: North Plains Mall 
Dear Armand: 
Pursuant to our conversation of Thursday February 24 you will find 
enclosed the following documents: 
1. A copy of the original computation of estimated value 
showing the allocation of 8,793 units in the new 
operating partnership to North Plains Mall. Your 
allocation of units is based on your 15% ownership 
interest (8,79 3 units x 15% = 1,319 units), and the 
issuance of units for the principal portion of your 
partner loan ($230,640 / $17.50 per unit = 13,179 units). 
The combined total units allocated to you would be 14,498 
units. The value of the units is initial offering price 
of the REIT stock. 3i2bsequen£_to_the_offering_£he_jzalue_ 
of the units will be equivalent to the value of__the__ 
publicly traded shares. 
2. A copy of the revised computation of estimated value 
schedule with the full accrual of interest on the partner 
loans. Based on the computation the partnership would be 
allocated 2,348 units in the operating partnership. The 
allocation of units based on your ownership of 15% would 
be 352 units. 
3. A copy of the balance sheets and a source and application 
of the due to managing general partner account for the 
period from December 31, 1988 through December 31, 1992; 
and 
4. A copy of the same information starting October 31, 1989, 
showing the activity for the two months ending December 
31, 1989. This schedule shows the change in the 
intercompany account for the general partner from the 
time of the capital call which was never picked up with 
the final settlement. 
Based on our discussion, we would pay you the principal amount of 
your partner loan in the amount of $230,640 plus allocate to you 
352 units in the operating partnership. The allocation of the 
Armand L. Smith 
March 8, 1994 
Page 2 
units should make the transaction non-taxable. You should, 
however, consult with your tax advisor relative to any negative 
basis gains and the handling of your own personal tax 
considerations. If you have specific tax questions regarding the 
transaction, please call me and I will put you in touch with our 
tax advisor on this transaction. 
Please review the enclosed items. If you have questions, please 
call. 
Si^epBly, 
Paul K. Mendenhall 
:ejrely
cc: John Price 
Warren P. King 
G. Rex Frazier 
Martin G. Peterson 
,H PLAINS MALL 
PUTATION OF ESTIMATED VALUE 
UARY 12, 1994 
NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE PARTNERSHIP 1,209,300 
LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAID O F (319,200) 
LESS NEU EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT 
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 33,000,000 - (.01545) TIMES A) 
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS 890,100 
RESERVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL (6.9%) 
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE 94.00% 
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION 836,694 
CAPITALIZATION RATE 9.00% 
GROSS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES, 
AND OFFERING EXPENSES 9,296,600 
LESS DEBT REPAYMENT (11,246,906) 
LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT (72,500) 
LESS PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON DEBT 
LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAN PAYMENT (1,680,916) 
PLUS NEW DEBT ALLOCATION 4,800,000 
LESS NEU EXPENSES ON NEW DEBT (3,968,000 DIVIDED 95,000,000 = (.0417) TIICS M) (206,400) 
LESS PUBLIC OFFERING EXPENSES 
(2,600,000 DIVIDED BY 262,500,000 = (.009905) TIMES H (92,083) 
LESS UNDERWRITING COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPITAL TO PAY EXISTING DEBT 
(16,200,000 DIVIDED BY 174,000,000 = (.09310) TIMES I PLUS L PLUM M) (756,700) 
ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 41,095 
ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (G TIMES Q) 3,699 
ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTNERSHIP UNITS (0 DIVIDED BY $17.50 PER SHARE) 2,348 
g. Smith's Letter of Inquiry of 3/16/94 
A R M A N D L. S M I T H 
P. O. BOX 159 
CLOVIS , N S W MEXICO SSIOI 
March 16, 1994 
Mr, Paul Mendenhall 
Price Development Company, 
Limited Partnership 
35 Century Parkway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Dear Paul: 
This is relative to your March 8th letter which I received March 14th, concerning the North 
Plains Mall. 
As I understand your offer it is: 
1. Repayment of partnership loan in the amount of $230,640, in cash. This would be 
the total amount without any interest. 
2. Value of 15% equity in project for 352 units in operating partnership at a value of 
$17.50 per unit or a total of $6,160. 
Is my understanding of your offer correct? 
Sincerely, ^ 






«J. Price Confirms 46,160 Letter of 3/17/94 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
35 CENTURY PARK-WAY • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
TELEPHONE (801) 486-3911 
TELECOPIER FAX (801) 486-765C 
March 17, 1994 Via Facsimile 
Original by Mail 
Armand L. Smith 
P.O. Box 159 
Clovis, New Mexico 88101 
Re: North Plains Mall - Clovis, New Mexico 
Dear Armand: 
I have received the facsimile copies of your letters of March 14 
and March 16, 19 94. In response to your questions: 
1. F. Charles Huber is our tax advisor on the transaction. He 
can be reached in care of Huber, Erickson and Bowman; 175 East 
400 South; Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. His telephone number 
is (801) 328-5000. If there are any questions Chuck is unable 
to address, I can have you talk directly to the tax partner at 
Rogers & Well in New York. 
2. With respect to interest on the loans from the partners, 
interest has been accrued on those loans but no interest has 
been paid. 
3. Your understanding of the valuation and allocation of the 
units is correct. 
If I can answer any further questions for you, please call. 
Sincerely, 
U2 
a u l K. Mendenhall 




[Q. Price's Withdrawal of $6,160 of 3/28/94 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
35 CENTURY PARK-WAY • SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84115 
TELEPHONE (801) 486-3911 
TELECOPIER/FA* (801) 48&-76S' 
March 28, 1994 Via Facsimile 
Original by Regular Mail 
Armand Smith 
P.O. Box 159 
Clovis, New Mexico 88102-0159 
Re: North Plains Mall 
Dear Armand: 
As a clarification and follow up to our conversation this morning 
and in anticipation of our meeting in Salt Lake on April 5, any 
offers or representations communicated regarding receipt of units 
in the operating partnership are hereby withdrawn. 
We look forward to meeting with you in Salt Lake next Tuesday to 
resolve any questions or outstanding issues. 
Paul K. Mendenhall 
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ARMAND L. SMITH, 
VIRGINIA L. SMITH, and the 
SMITH TRUSTS 
v. 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
n/k/a FAIRFAX REALTY, INC., 
NORTH PLAINS LAND COMPANY, LTD., 
a Utah limited partnership, and 
NORTH PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., 
a Utah limited partnership 
SUMMARY 
EXPERT DAMAGE ANALYSIS 
of 
MERRILL R. NORMAN, CPA 




Value of North Plains Mall Based on Mr. Howden's Appraisal on January 1,1994 
Various Treatments of Debt 
Measurement of Smiths' Partnership Interests as of 3/15/01 Analysis Two* 
1 Value per Howden Appraisal (1/1/94) 
2 Less: Mortgage Loan Repayment 
3 Value of Partnership Interests (Net of Chemical Bank Mortgage) (Line 1 less Line 2) 
4 Less: Intercompany Loan Repayment 
5 Less: Price Capital/Loan Repayment 
6 Less: Smith Capital/Loan Repayment 
7 Estimated Net Value of Partnership (Line 3 less Lines 4-6) 
8 Smiths' Ownership Percentage 
9 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests (Line 6 multiplied by Line 7) at 1/1/94 
10a Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests at BankOne 
Prime +2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01) 
10b Plus: Value of Water Rights contributed by Smiths to Partnership (approx. 1/1990) 
11 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests at 3/15/01 (Line 9 plus Line 10) 
Measurement of Smiths' Debt Interests as of 3/15/01 
12 Beginning Loan Balance of Smiths' as of approximately January 1990 
13 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime 
+2% (1/1/90 to 1/1/94) 
14 Value of Smiths' Debt Interests as of 1/1/94 (Line 12 plus Line 13) 
15 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime 
+2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01) 
16 Value of Smith's Debt Interests as of 3/15/01 (Line 14 plus Line 15) 
Measurement of Smiths' Combined Partnership and Debt Interests as of 3/15/01 
17 Value of Smiths' Partnership and Debt Interests at 3/15/01 (Line 11 plus Line 16) 
18 Plus: Expert Witness Fees 
19 Total Damages, excluding Attoney's Fees, due Smiths (Line 17 plus Line 19) 
Footnotes: 
A



























1Z State Farm: App. Br. Constitutional Issue 
JUN 7 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981564 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable William B. Bohling, District Court Judge, Presiding 
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Washington, D.C. 20006-1101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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limine, proffers and petition for extraordinary writ. R.3704-08, 3716-20, 7181, 7330-50, 
7402-07. 
4. Whether State Farm is entitled to judgment on (a) Mrs. Campbell's bad faith claim 
because she lacked standing to sue and/or State Farm owed her no duty and (b) Mrs. 
Campbell's fraud claim because the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of that 
claim. SOR: Issue (a) is a legal one that is reviewed for correctness. See House v. Armour 
of Am.. Inc.. 886 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1994). Issue (b): whether "viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). Preserved: Motions 
for partial summary judgment, directed verdict and JNOV. See R.4407-22, 7758-63, 7873-
8044, 8701-9028, 9273-9517, 10286:18-31. 
5. Whether (a) the evidence of plaintiffs' emotional distress was insufficient to 
support their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and (b) the remitted 
emotional distress awards of $600,000 and $400,000 are excessive. SOR: Issue (a): Same 
as 4(b). Issue (b): Is there a "reasonable basis" to support the decision. Crookston. 817 P.2d 
at 805. Preserved: Motion and memorandum for partial summary judgment on IIED 
(R.4426-4543); Motion for directed verdict (R. 10286:48-52); Motion and memoranda for 
JNOV, new trial/remittitur (see R.7758-73; 7873-8044; 8701-9028; 9273-9517). 
6. Whether the $25 million punitive damages award is excessive in violation of Utah 
law and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. SOR: The 
trial court is required to articulate reasons warranting its decision which will allow effective 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES: 
A. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, §1; UTAH CONST, art. I, §7. [Add. 1] 
B. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-2-5; 31A-2-308. [Add. 2] 
C Utah R. Civ. P. 50, 54, 59; Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404, 702, 703, 705. [Add. 3] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This suit was brought against State Farm by Curtis Campbell, a State Farm 
policyholder, and his wife Inez, for damages arising from State Farm's decision to try a third-
party automobile accident case in which Mr. Campbell was the defendant, rather than 
accepting offers to settle for the insurance policy limits. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
The instant case was bifurcated. R.2839-43. Phase 1 was tried in 1995. The jury found 
that there was a substantial likelihood of excess judgments being entered against Curtis 
Campbell in the underlying automobile accident case, and that State Farm acted 
unreasonably in failing to settle. R.4316-19. [Add. 4] Phase II was tried June 4-July 31, 
1996. In it, plaintiffs put on an "institutional" case, which consisted of extensive testimony 
by two "experts" and perhaps a dozen other witnesses, designed to show that State Farm 
cheats policyholders and claimants nationwide by underpaying claims in a wide variety of 
circumstances. The jury awarded special damages of $911.25 for State Farm's mishandling 
of Mr. Campbell's case. In addition, as a result of the "institutional" evidence, the jury found 
State Farm liable for the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and fraud 
and awarded damages for emotional distress of $1.4 million and $1.2 million to Mr. and Mrs. 
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